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Abstract
This paper reviews four decades of economics research on the brain drain,
with a focus on recent contributions and on development issues. We ￿rst as-
sess the magnitude, intensity and determinants of the brain drain, showing
that brain drain (or high-skill) migration is becoming the dominant pattern of
international migration and a major aspect of globalization. We then use a styl-
ized growth model to analyze the various channels through which a brain drain
a⁄ects the sending countries and review the evidence on these channels. The
recent empirical literature shows that high-skill emigration need not deplete a
country￿ s human capital stock and can generate positive network externalities.
Three case studies are also considered: the African medical brain drain, the
recent exodus of European scientists to the United States, and the role of the
Indian diaspora in the development of India￿ s IT sector. We conclude with a
discussion of the implications of the analysis for education, immigration, and
international taxation policies in a global context.
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11 Introduction
The number of international migrants increased from 75 million in 1960 to 190 million
in 2005, at about the same pace as the world population, meaning that the world
migration rate increased only slightly, from 2.5 to 2.9 percent.1 Over the same period,
the world trade/GDP ratio increased threefold, rising from 0.1 to 0.2 between 1960
and 1990 and from 0.2 to 0.3 between 1990 and 2000; the ratio of FDI to world output,
on the other hand, increased threefold during the 1990s alone. From these ￿gures
one might conclude that globalization is mainly about trade and FDI, not migration.
However, the picture changes once the focus is narrowed to migration to developed
countries and in particular its skilled component. As shown in Figure 1, the share
of the foreign-born in the population of high-income countries has tripled since 1960
(and doubled since 1985). Moreover, these immigrants are increasingly skilled: while
migration to the OECD area increased at the same rate as trade, high-skill migration
(or brain drain) from developing to developed countries rose at a much faster pace2
and can certainly be regarded as one of the major aspects of globalization. What are
the causes of this brain drain at the international level, and what are its consequences
for sending countries? This paper surveys four decades of economic research on this
topic, with a focus on the more recent period.
The ￿rst wave of economics papers on the brain drain dates back to the late
1960s and mainly consists of welfare analyses in standard trade-theoretic frameworks
(e.g., Grubel and Scott, 1966, Johnson, 1967, Berry and Soligo, 1969). These early
contributions generally concluded that the impact of the brain drain on source coun-
tries was essentially neutral and emphasized the bene￿ts of free migration to the
world economy. This was explained by the fact that high-skill emigrants often leave
some of their assets in their country of origin, which complements remaining high-
and low-skill labor (Berry and Soligo, 1969), as well as sending home remittances.
This and other positive feedbacks compensate sending countries for any real loss the
brain drain may cause. From a broader perspective, these studies (especially Grubel
and Scott, 1966) emphasize high-skill migrants￿contribution to knowledge, an in-
ternational public good, and disregard "outdated" claims on the alleged losses for
developing countries. The second wave comes less than a decade later. Under the
leadership of Jagdish Bhagwati, a series of alternative models were developed in the
1970s to explore the welfare consequences of the brain drain in various institutional
settings. Domestic labor markets rigidities, informational imperfections, as well as
￿scal and other types of externalities (Bhagwati and Hamada, 1974, McCulloch and
Yellen, 1977) were introduced to emphasize the negative consequences of the brain
drain for those left behind. High-skill emigration was viewed as contributing to in-
1An increase mostly due to the dislocation of the former Soviet Union. See Ozden et al. (2011).
2The number of highly educated immigrants living in the OECD member countries increased by
70 percent during the 1990s (and doubled for those originating from developing countries) compared
to a 30 percent increase for low-skill immigrants.
2creased inequality at the international level, with rich countries becoming richer at
the expenses of poor countries. The ￿rst papers to analyze the brain drain in an
endogenous growth framework rested on similar arguments and arrived at similar
conclusions (e.g., Miyagiwa, 1991, Haque and Kim, 1995).


















World real trade / World GDP (a)
Stock of immigrants / Population in high-income countries (b)
Notes. (a) Authors￿computations using trade data from Barriel and
Dean (2004) and GDP data from the WDI. (b) UNDP data.
Finally, there has been a third wave of interest since the late 1990s. Based on
the fact that the brain drain has both detrimental and bene￿cial e⁄ects for origin
countries, its objective was to characterize the conditions under which the net e⁄ect
on development and welfare is positive or negative. The contribution of the theo-
retical literature has been to show that under certain circumstances, the brain drain
may ultimately prove bene￿cial (but of course is not necessarily so) to the source
country, and to do this while accounting for the various ￿scal and technological ex-
ternalities that were at the heart of the pessimistic models of the 1970s.3 At the
same time, thanks to the availability of new migration data, the various feedback
e⁄ects emphasized in the early literature have given rise to an increasingly important
empirical literature, further contributing to the emergence of a more balanced view
of the brain drain. The main contribution of the recent literature, therefore, is that
it is evidence-based, something which was not possible until recently due to the lack
of decent comparative data on international migration by educational attainment.
3Mountford (1995, 1997), Stark, Helmenstein and Prskawetz (1997, 1998), Vidal (1998), Docquier
and Rapoport (1999), Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2001), and Stark and Wang (2002) are the
main initial theoretical contributions.
3The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a quantitative assessment
of the development and spatial distribution of the brain drain and an analysis of its
determinants. In Section 3 we develop a benchmark closed-economy model of endoge-
nous human capital formation and economic performance. This model is extended in
Section 4 to analyze the various channels through which brain drain migration a⁄ects
the economic performance and growth prospects of sending countries. The main chan-
nels to be covered are remittances, temporary and return migration, human capital
formation, and network/diaspora e⁄ects on trade, FDI ￿ ows, technology adoption,
and home country institutions. Section 5 is devoted to country (India), regional
(European Union) and sectoral (health professionals) case-studies. Finally, Section 6
discusses policy implications from the perspective of sending and receiving countries.
2 Data and determinants of the brain drain
2.1 How extensive and intensive is the brain drain?
In the rest of this paper we use a number of new migration datasets to analyze the
size, development and spatial distribution of the brain drain. These data sets are all
very recent and based on OECD immigration data. Therefore, the ￿gures mostly deal
with the size and skill structure of immigration to OECD member countries, which
we estimate represents about half of the total world migration and about 85 percent
of the high-skill migration.4 While this allows reasonable estimates of the brain drain
for most countries to be computed, the fact that South-South migration is excluded
may lead to a substantial under-estimation in some cases. However, immigration data
by skill level is available for some developing countries and will be used to supplement
existing OECD-based datasets.5
Following Docquier and Marfouk (2006) we de￿ne a "high-skill immigrant" as a
foreign-born individual, aged 25 or more, holding an academic or professional degree
beyond high-school (i.e., a "college graduate") at the census or survey date. Three
caveats immediately come to mind: illegal immigration, home and host-country ed-
ucation, and heterogeneity in human capital levels. The ￿rst of these caveats is not
a big source of concern because high-skill individuals tend to migrate legally; in ad-
dition, the data is for stocks and not ￿ ows (there is a high turnover among illegal
migrants, many of whom either return home or are regularized after some time).6
The second caveat, namely, that all foreign-born individuals with college education
4In 2000, the number of high-skill immigrants recorded in OECD countries was 20.5 million. In
Section 2.5.4, we add 30 non-OECD destinations, increasing the ￿gure to 23.1 million. Given that
the number of high-skill migrants to the rest of the world is likely very small, a total ￿gure of 24
million (85% of whom are in the OECD) seems reasonable.
5Note that the OECD contains important sending countries such as Mexico, Poland and Turkey.
6The United States tries to account for illegal immigration in its census. See Hanson (2006) for
a comprehensive analysis of illegal migration from Mexico.
4are considered to be part of the brain drain is potentially more serious. As explained
below, we are able to correct for this to a large extent provided that age at migration
can be used as a proxy for where education was acquired. The third caveat concerns
the distinctions between ￿eld, degree, and actual occupation. In that case too, we will
try to re￿ne the de￿nitions and account for heterogeneity among high-skill workers.
2.1.1 Brain drain to OECD destinations
Table 1 summarizes the data on emigration stocks and rates for di⁄erent country
groups in 1990 and 2000. The ￿gures are taken from Docquier, Lowell and Marfouk
(2009) (henceforth DLM), who provide emigration stocks and rates at three educa-
tional levels (primary, secondary and tertiary/college) by gender for all the countries
of the world based on immigration data from the countries which were members of
the OECD in 2000.7 Countries are grouped according to demographic size, average
income (using the World Bank classi￿cation), and region. It shows that over the last
few decades, the brain drain has increased dramatically in magnitude (in terms of
stocks) but not necessarily in intensity (in terms of emigration rates). This can be
explained by the parallel rise in educational attainments.8 As expected, emigration
rates decrease with country size: average emigration rates are seven times higher in
small countries (with populations of less than 2.5 million) than in large countries (with
populations over 25 million). These di⁄erences cannot be attributed to di⁄erences
in the educational structure of the home country population or to greater selection
bias (ratio of high-skill to total emigration rates) in small countries. The highest
emigration rates are observed in middle income countries where people have both
the incentive and the means to emigrate: high-income countries (low incentives) and
low-income countries (more binding credit constraints and less transferable human
capital) have lower rates. The regions most a⁄ected by brain drain are the Caribbean,
the Paci￿c, sub-Saharan Africa, and Central America.
Table 2 depicts the situation of the 30 countries most a⁄ected by the brain drain in
2000. The table is restricted to countries with at least 4 million inhabitants. In terms
of magnitude (absolute numbers), the main international suppliers of brains are the
Philippines (1.111 million), India (1.035 million), Mexico (0.949 million) and China
(0.784 million) among developing countries, with the United Kingdom (1.479 million)
7DLM (2009) updated and extended (to include gender) the Docquier and Marfouk (2006) data
set. Denoting by Ms
i;t the number of working-aged emigrants from country i of skill s (s = h for high-
skill and s = l for low-skill workers) in year t and by Ns
i;t the corresponding number of residents,








: Dumont and Lema￿tre (2004) use
similar de￿nitions and provide emigration rates by education level for 102 countries in 2000. They
consider the population aged 15+ (rather than the 25+ used by Docquier and Marfouk (2006)) and
use a slightly more restrictive de￿nition of ￿tertiary education￿ .
8Recall that these ￿gures are computed for immigration to the OECD only. In Section 2.1.5 we
extend the coverage to include some non-OECD countries. Note also that the ￿gures are for gross
emigration rates (as we have no data on immigration to developing countries).
5and Germany (0.945 million) completing the top of the list. In terms of intensity,
small countries are obviously most a⁄ected. High-skill emigration rates exceed 80
percent in countries such as Guyana, Jamaica and Haiti, and are above 50 percent in
many African countries. After excluding countries with population below 4 million,
the top of the list mainly features middle-sized poor countries from various regions.
Table 1. Emigration stocks and rates to OECD destinations
Variable Total stocka Share high-skb Rate low-skc Rate high-skc
Year 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000 1990 2000
World 41996 58619 29.9 35.0 1.3 1.3 5.1 5.5
By income group
High-income 18206 19890 31.7 39.9 3.9 3.6 4.0 3.9
Upper-Middle-income 9166 15403 22.2 24.3 2.7 3.6 5.5 6.2
Lower-Middle-income 9884 15586 31.8 36.6 0.8 0.9 8.1 8.1
Low-income 3554 6499 37.5 45.3 0.3 0.3 5.5 7.6
By country size
Above 25 million 25672 36508 30.6 36.4 0.9 1.0 3.8 4.2
From 10 to 25m 6394 8660 29.2 34.2 2.3 2.3 8.5 8.5
From 2.5 to 10m 7230 10011 28.8 33.2 4.1 4.3 13.9 14.5
Below 2.5 million 1515 2200 31.6 35.4 6.1 6.8 26.5 27.5
By region
Africa
Northern Africa 1705 2306 15.3 20.2 2.6 2.6 9.3 7.9
Sub-Saharan Africa 1209 2158 39.7 43.6 0.3 0.4 13.2 12.8
Americas
Caribbean 1955 3011 35.4 38.2 8.2 10.4 44.0 43.0
Central America 3487 8051 17.3 17.1 7.3 12.1 13.7 17.1
South America 1577 2904 39.9 39.8 0.5 0.7 4.8 5.1
USA & Canada 1427 1537 50.3 61.9 1.9 2.3 1.0 0.9
Asia
Eastern Asia 2647 4128 48.5 54.6 0.2 0.2 3.7 4.1
South-Central Asia 2070 3691 43.1 52.1 0.2 0.2 3.9 5.3
South-Eastern Asia 2584 4363 46.2 49.3 0.6 0.7 10.8 9.8
Middle East 2204 3202 20.3 23.2 3.4 3.6 9.8 8.4
Europe
Eastern Europe 3633 4457 24.0 35.4 3.2 2.5 3.6 4.5
Western Europe 15859 16908 25.3 31.5 5.7 5.4 8.9 8.9
Oceania
Australia & N. Zealand 383 564 43.3 51.9 1.9 2.1 4.3 5.7
Paci￿c islands 141 228 38.7 37.9 2.7 3.1 61.2 52.3
a Total stock of emigrants aged 25+. b Share of college graduates. c Emigration rate of high- (HS)
and low-skill (LS) workers. Source: Docquier, Lowell and Marfouk (2009)
6Table 2. Most and least a⁄ected countries (with pop. above 4m)
Highest stocksa Highest rates in percentb Lowest rates in percentb
United Kingdom 1479604 Haiti 83.4 Turkmenistan 0.4
Philippines 1111704 Sierra Leone 49.2 United States 0.5
India 1035197 Ghana 44.7 Tajikistan 0.6
Mexico 949476 Kenya 38.5 Uzbekistan 0.8
Germany 944579 Laos 37.2 Kyrgyzstan 0.9
China 783881 Uganda 36.0 Saudi Arabia 0.9
Korea 613909 Eritrea 35.2 Kazakhstan 1.2
Canada 523916 Somalia 34.5 Japan 1.2
Vietnam 507200 El Salvador 31.7 Russia 1.4
Poland 456337 Rwanda 31.7 Azerbaijan 1.8
United States 427081 Nicaragua 30.2 Brazil 2.0
Italy 397247 Hong Kong 29.6 Thailand 2.2
Cuba 331969 Cuba 28.8 Burkina Faso 2.6
France 317744 Sri Lanka 28.2 Australia 2.7
Iran 304389 Papua New Guinea 27.8 Georgia 2.8
Hong Kong 292657 Vietnam 27.0 Argentina 2.8
Japan 278360 Honduras 24.8 Indonesia 2.9
Taiwan 274368 Croatia 24.6 Belarus 3.2
Russia 270794 Guatemala 23.9 France 3.5
Netherlands 258075 Mozambique 22.6 Angola 3.7
Ukraine 249165 Afghanistan 22.6 Paraguay 3.8
Colombia 233364 Dominican Republic 22.4 Venezuela 3.8
Pakistan 220881 Cambodia 21.5 China 3.8
Turkey 176558 Malawi 20.9 Myanmar 3.9
South Africa 173411 Portugal 19.0 Nepal 4.0
Peru 164287 Morocco 18.6 Moldova 4.1
Romania 164214 Cameroon 17.3 Spain 4.2
Greece 162129 Senegal 17.2 Libya 4.3
Serbia Montenegro 161885 United Kingdom 17.1 India 4.3
Indonesia 156960 Togo 16.5 Ukraine 4.3
Notes. a Stocks of high-skill emigrants aged 25+ in 2000. b Emigration rates of college graduates
as percentage of the national high-skilled labor force in 2000. Source: DLM (2009).
2.1.2 Extensions
Correcting for age of entry. The ￿gures above consider all foreign-born individuals
as immigrants independent of where their education was acquired. This may lead to
an over-estimation of the brain drain if a substantial proportion of today￿ s highly
skilled immigrants emigrated as children and acquired most of their education in
their destination countries. Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2007) (BDR) collected
7data on the age-of-entry structure of immigration and used this as a proxy for whether
education was acquired in the home or the host country. Since this information was
not available for all OECD countries, their data set combines observations (75 percent
of the data) and estimates from a gravity model (for the remaining 25 percent). As
shown in Table 3, controlling for age of entry has a strong e⁄ect on the measures of
brain drain in countries with a relatively long history of migration.
Table 3. Brain drain from selecteed countries by age of entry (percent)
Origin Rate 0+a Rate 12+b Rate 18+b Rate 22+b Ratio 22+/0+
Mongolia 7.4 7.3 7.3 7.2 97.4
Mozambique 22.5 22.3 22.1 21.8 96.9
Malawi 20.9 20.4 20.2 20.1 96.2
China 3.8 3.5 3.3 3.0 79.9
Switzerland 9.5 8.3 7.9 7.1 74.0
South Africa 7.4 6.4 5.8 5.4 73.1
Morocco 18.0 15.6 14.2 12.9 71.5
United Kingdom 17.1 14.6 13.3 11.9 69.9
Indonesia 2.9 2.6 2.4 2.0 69.7
Canada 4.7 3.5 3.1 2.7 56.9
Costa Rica 7.1 5.9 4.9 4.0 56.1
Kuwait 7.1 6.4 5.3 3.9 54.8
Cambodia 21.4 17.3 13.5 11.2 52.2
Mexico 15.5 12.4 9.9 7.9 51.3
Notes. a Emigration rates of college graduates as in DLM (2009). b Idem after excluding those who
immigrated before age 12, 18 or 22 (Beine, Docquier and Rapoport, 2007).
Obviously, an approach based on census data is not perfect. As Rosenzweig (2005)
explains, ￿information on entry year is based on answers to an ambiguous question￿
in the US Census the question is ￿ When did you ￿rst come to stay?￿ Immigrants
might answer this question by providing the date when they received a permanent
immigrant status instead of the date when they ￿rst came to the US, at which time
they might not have intended to or been able to stay.￿Only surveys based on compre-
hensive individual migration histories can provide precise information about where
schooling was acquired. Such survey data are only available for a few countries, and
in general they do not provide a representative cross-sectional picture of immigrants￿
characteristics. An exception is the US New Immigrant Survey (NIS), a nationally
representative multi-cohort longitudinal study of new legal immigrants and their chil-
dren in the United States. However, the proportion of highly skilled immigrants from
each country with US tertiary schooling given by the US census only has a correlation
of 0.26 with that given by the NIS in 2000. The NIS dataset indicates that, out of
140 countries, there were 24 which apparently had no skilled emigrants educated in
the US and 14 where all of their skilled emigrants were apparently educated in the
8US. This could be due to small sample size; and indeed these 35 extreme observa-
tions all concerned very small immigrant communities. The correlation between NIS
and census ￿gures rises to 47.7 percent after excluding all the countries with less
than 100,000 immigrants to the US. These comparisons indicate that, although the
NIS results are derived from answers to a much more precise question, they may be
noisy, given the relatively small sample sizes, for countries with a small number of
immigrants in the US.
Panel data. As seen above, the brain drain increased both in magnitude and in-
tensity during the 1990s. Is this also true over a longer time-span? Focusing on the six
major destination countries (USA, Canada, Australia, Germany, the UK and France),
which together account for 75 percent of total immigration to the OECD in 2000, De-
foort (2008) computed high-skill emigration stocks and rates for each ￿ve-year period
between 1975 and 2000. Based on these six destinations, high-skill emigration rates
appear to be remarkably stable over this period. This stability is in fact the product
of two opposing forces: on the one hand, migration rates increased for all educa-
tion categories; on the other hand, general increases in educational attainment have
driven selection biases down in all parts of the world. However, Figure 2 shows that
some regions have experienced an increase in the intensity of the brain drain (Cen-
tral America, Eastern Europe, sub-Saharan Africa, and South-Central Asia) while
signi￿cant decreases have occured in others (e.g., the Caribbean, Northern Africa).
The gender dimension. The proportion of women in total international migra-
tion increased from 46.8% to 49.6% between 1960 and 2005 (United Nations, 2005).
Two recent data sets documenting the gender structure of the brain drain (Docquier,
Lowell and Marfouk, 2009, and Dumont, Martin and Spielvogel, 2007) have shown
that highly skilled women are over-represented among international migrants (see
Figure 3). Using separate regressions for males and females, Docquier et al. (2009)
showed that highly skilled women were more migratory than highly skilled males after
controlling for country-speci￿c and gender-speci￿c explanatory variables.9 However,
they also showed that the gender gap in international high-skill migration is not ev-
ident in a correctly speci￿ed model that allows for the interdependencies between
males and females migration (due to, for example, joint decisions or family reunion
programs). Docquier et al. (2009) also showed that women and men respond di⁄er-
ently to push factors, and that skilled women are more responsive to the emigration
of skilled men than vice versa.
9It could also be that the over-representation of women in high-skill emigration is driven by
international demands for feminized occupations such as nursing. However, we are not aware of
comparative data on occupations by gender which would allow this conjecture to be tested.
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Note. Emigration rate of college graduates by country group and gender. Source: DLM (2009).
Brain drain to non-OECD countries. A natural extension of the DLM data
set is to collect census data on immigration from a set of non-OECD countries for
10which immigration data by education level is available. In this section, we extend the
DLM database by adding census data from ten non-OECD European countries (Bul-
garia, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Romania, Slovenia, Croatia and
Macedonia), three Asian countries (Singapore, Israel and the Philippines), six Latin
American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Colombia, Venezuela), ￿ve
African countries (South Africa, Rwanda, Uganda, Kenya and Ivory Coast), and
estimates for six Persian Gulf countries (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman,
Qatar and the United Arab Emirates). Comparing the high-skill emigration rates in
DLM2009 with those in the extended set of 54 host countries, it appears that the brain
drain rate for 13 countries is more than doubled when emigration to non-OECD coun-
tries is considered: Namibia (￿8.7), Lesotho (￿6.0), Yemen (￿5.5), Bahrain (￿5.4),
Burkina Faso (￿4.3), Swaziland (￿3.6), Sudan (￿2.6), Tajikistan (￿2.5), Uzbekistan
(￿2.3), Turkmenistan (￿2.2), Belarus (￿2.2), Niger (￿2.1) and Moldova (￿2.0). The
rate is multiplied by more than 1.5 in 20 other countries.
2.2 Empirical analysis of the determinants of the brain drain
2.2.1 Push and pull determinants of the brain drain
Mayda (2010) analyzed the role of push and pull factors in international migration,
showing that the impact of push factors on aggregate emigration rates (without edu-
cational breakdown) is relatively small compared to those of distance and pull factors.
Using the DLM data set, Docquier, Lohest and Marfouk (2007) proposed a similar
analysis by education level. They ￿rst decomposed the brain drain as the product of





































Table 4 shows Docquier, Lohest and Marfouk￿ s (2007) results for developing coun-
tries in Columns (1) and (2), and our own regression results for high-income countries
using the same parsimonious speci￿cation as theirs in columns (3) and (4). The re-
sults are obtained using OLS with White￿ s correction for heteroskedasticity; they are
robust to the econometric technique (IV with instrumented level of development, ran-
dom e⁄ect in a panel model with 2 observations per country, SURE). Table 4 gives the
results for the parsimonious speci￿cations only, after non-signi￿cant variables have
been dropped. For example, country size (as measured by the log of population) was
initially included in the selection regressions, but turned out to be non-signi￿cant
and was therefore dropped; hence, it appears in blank in Columns (2) and (4).
The results for developing countries show that high-skill emigration is less sensitive
to geographic variables such as distance (whose coe¢ cient becomes less negative once
the selection bias is accounted for), increases with the degree of religious fractional-
ization at origin (via the selection bias) and decreases with the level of development at
11origin (the e⁄ect of the selection bias is larger than that of openness). The size of the
country also matters: small states are more open than large countries. Comparing
developing and developed countries, we see that the coe¢ cients usually have similar
signs but di⁄erent magnitudes. The brain drain from high income countries is less
responsive to distance and other geographic characteristics. The selection bias, on the
other hand, is less responsive to immigration policies at destination and to the level
of development. Finally, the degree of openness in rich countries does not depend on
the level of development (which is more homogenous in high-income countries).
Table 4. Determinants of aggregate high-skill emigration rates
Developing High-income
Openness Select. bias Openness Select. bias
Native population (log) -0.175 - -0.428 -
(2.82)*** (5.35)***
Small islands 0.957 - - -
(2.91)***
Development level 0.535 -0.913 -0.515 -0.488
(4.18)*** (15.10)*** (1.56) (3.06)***
Oil exporting country -0.545 0.193 -2.579 0.403
(1.48) (1.54) (4.35)*** (3.59)***
Dist from selective ctries (log) -1.021 0.407 -0.257 0.155
(3.06)*** (4.36)*** (1.39) (2.71)**
Distance from EU15 -0.394 0.125 -0.189 0.111
(3.80)*** (2.37)** (1.81)* (4.04)***
Landlock -0.887 0.146 -0.746 0.195
(2.68)*** (1.37) (2.14)** (2.01)*
Religious fractionalization - 0.585 - 0.333
(4.05)*** (1.71)*
Main dest = selective country - 0.890 - 0.110
(6.10)*** (1.31)
Main destination = EU15 - 0.539 - -
(3.16)***
Constant 10.404 -2.245 8.955 -0.150
(3.29)*** (2.17)** (3.29)*** (0.15)
Observations 108 108 36 34
Adjusted R-squared 0.68 0.88 0.68 0.78
Notes. OLS estimates with White correction for heteroskedasticity. Robust t statistics in
parentheses. * signi￿cant at 10%; ** signi￿cant at 5%; *** signi￿cant at 1%
2.2.2 The (positive) selection of international migrants
A number of recent empirical studies have used the bilateral dimension of the above
described databases to characterize the pattern of selection in international migra-
12tion. Grogger and Hanson (2011) use the DLM bilateral emigration stocks and rates
observed in 2000 and wage and earnings distributions by skills and occupations to
explain two important characteristics of international labor movements: positive se-
lection (i.e., migrants having higher than average skills) and positive sorting (i.e.,
the tendency for highly skilled migrants to locate in countries with high returns to
skills). The selection regression reveals that the educational gap between migrants
and non-migrants tends to widen with the skill-related di⁄erence in earnings between
destination and source countries. The sorting regression, on the other hand, reveals
that the relative stock of high-skill migrants in a destination increases with the earn-
ings di⁄erential between high and low-skill workers. This correlation is stronger when
wage di⁄erences are adjusted for taxes. On the whole, simulations using the point
estimates from the regressions show that wage di⁄erentials explain 58 percent of the
immigrant-skill gap in bilateral migration ￿ ows vis-￿-vis the US benchmark.
Using similar techniques and databases, Belot and Hatton (2008) ￿nd smaller
e⁄ects of wage di⁄erentials on selection. They measure the skill premium as the
ratio of wages in a set of high-skill versus low-skill occupations. They ￿nd that the
greater the returns to skills in the destination as compared to the source country,
the stronger the positive selection of immigrants, as in Grogger and Hanson (2011),
however this is obtained only once poverty measures are introduced to account for
credit constraints on migration. Belot and Hatton (2008) also ￿nd that factors such as
linguistic, cultural, and geographic proximity are stronger determinants of selection
patterns than factors such as the relative return to skills, poverty in source countries,
or immigration policies in receiving countries.
Finally, Beine, Docquier and Ozden (2011) disregard country-speci￿c variables
(captured by ￿xed e⁄ects) and focus instead on the role of networks/diasporas (as
measured by migration stocks in 1990) on the size and composition of bilateral mi-
gration ￿ ows. Accounting for the usual determinants of migration and for potential
endogeneity biases,10 they show that larger diasporas increase the size of migration
￿ ows and lower the average educational level of new migrants.11 After extracting the
explained partial sum of squares, existing diasporas explain a large proportion of the
variability in the size of migration ￿ ows (71 percent) and the patterns of migrants￿
selection (47 percent). These proportions capture the joint e⁄ect of network exter-
nalities and lower migration costs (self-selection channel) and that of family reunion
programs (policy channel).
A common limitation of all the papers discussed above is that they do not record
where immigrants￿education was acquired. However, the assimilation of highly skilled
10Diasporas are instrumented by a dummy variable capturing the existence of bilateral guest-
worker programs in the 1960s, and an interaction between indicators of total immigration at desti-
nation in 1960, distance, and a measure of con￿ icts in the source country in the 1950s.
11This is in accord with McKenzie and Rapoport￿ s results (2010). They found that migration
networks increase the degree of negative selection (or lower the degree of positive selection) among
Mexican immigrants to the United States.
13workers at destination and the level of their earnings abroad depend strongly on
the transferability of human capital. Unsurprisingly, workers trained at destination
enjoy higher wages and employment rates than workers trained in their countries
of origin, especially if they come from countries with low-quality education systems
(Coulombe and Tremblay, 2009). A potentially pro￿table route for a prospective
migrant is, therefore, to migrate ￿rst as a student. Using the US New Immigrants
Survey (NIS), Rosenzweig (2008) ￿nds that there are larger per-capita numbers of
foreign students in the United States from low skill-price countries, and that sending
countries with relatively high skill prices succeed in bringing more students back (even
after controlling for the quality and quantity of their higher education institutions).
This is consistent with the students seeking to acquire schooling abroad in order to
obtain jobs in the host countries.
Another important limitation on existing studies is the poor state of knowledge on
immigration policies, which are imperfectly captured using variables such as number
of asylum seekers or the existence of free-mobility agreements (such as the Schengen
agreement). This gap in knowledge is partly ￿lled by Ortega and Peri (2009), who
put together a dataset on immigration laws and policies (still very preliminary and
incomplete) to augment the Grogger and Hanson (2011) model. On the whole, they
con￿rm the role of income maximization and of immigration laws in determining the
size of migration ￿ ows. However, their migration dataset is an extension of Mayda￿ s
(2010) and makes no distinction between skill groups.
Our overview of the current state of international migration data shows that
substantial progress has been achieved in the last decade; however, the state of inter-
national migration data remains very poor compared to that on international trade
and capital ￿ ows. Bilateral international trade data are classi￿ed according to a very
large and detailed set of characteristics and are reported on a monthly basis. On the
other hand, bilateral aggregate (country-level) migration data are obtained mostly
from censuses that are conducted every ten years, a reporting frequency that is less
than one percent of that for trade data. Partly due to these data constraints, cross-
country analyses of international migration still lag behind the empirical literature
on international trade and ￿nancial ￿ ows.
3 A benchmark economy without migration
This section presents a stylized model of human capital accumulation and endogenous
growth for an economy without migration; it will be used as a benchmark in the next
sections where we allow for high-skill workers￿emigration and model the channels
through which such emigration a⁄ects the growth performance of home countries.
Our model depicts an economy populated by ￿rms and individuals living for three
periods: two working periods (youth and adulthood) and a retirement period (old-
age). We ￿rst characterize the production sector and derive a wage-setting equa-
tion endogenizing economic performance as a function of human capital. Then we
14characterize the accumulation of human capital and derive a skill-setting equation
endogenizing human capital accumulation as a function of economic performance.
3.1 The wage-setting equation
At each period of time, physical capital (Kt) and labor in e¢ ciency units (Ht) are
combined to produce a composite good (Yt) according to a Cobb-Douglas production
function. Human capital (or labor in e¢ ciency units) sums high-skill and low-skill
labor which we treat as perfect substitutes.12 Normalizing the number of e¢ ciency
units o⁄ered by a low-skill worker to one, a high-skill worker is assumed to o⁄er
1+￿ > 1 units (￿ > 0). Hence, the GDP per worker (yt) is a function of the stock of










where At is a time-varying scale parameter a⁄ecting total factor productivity and
￿ 2 [0;1] is the share of capital in the national income.
International movements of physical capital are such that the returns to physical
capital are equalized (net of any risk premiums and transaction costs) across nations.
We assume that capital fully depreciates in one period and that from the perspective
of potential investors, each country is characterized by a given risk premium.13 The
following arbitrage condition thus implicitly de￿nes the equilibrium amount of capital









t is the risk-free international interest factor at time t (one plus the interest
rate) and ￿t ￿ 1 is equal to one plus the risk premium.






Rearranging Equation (2) and substituting it into Equation (1) allows the GDP






















12Many empirical studies advocate using an elasticity of substitution between high-skill and low-
skill workers greater than two to match skill premium data in developing countries. In their study
on immigration and inequality, Ottaviano and Peri (2008) use a range of estimates between 1.5 and
3. Angrist (1995) recommends a value around 2 to explain the evolution of the college premium on
the Palestinian labor market during the 1980s.
13Note that in our view the risk premium has two components: a standard risk premium borne
by all (domestic and foreign) investors and related to the quality of governance in that country, and
an international transaction cost borne by foreign investors only. See Section 4.5.1. below where
this distinction is formally introduced.
15Clearly, the gap in economic performance linearly depends on the ratio of the e¢ -
ciency units of labor per worker, decreases with the ratio of the risk premiums and
is a convex function of the ratio of the productivities.
Using Equations (3) and (2), the wage rate per e¢ ciency unit of labor can also


















The ratio of wage rates !t does not depend directly on human capital endow-
ments. However, the level of technology may reasonably be considered as an in-
creasing function of the average quality of workers. This is in line with Lucas (1988)
who assumed that productivity positively depends on the economy-wide average level
of human capital, and with the neo-Schumpeterian growth literature where the ca-
pacity to innovate or adopt modern technologies depends on the average quality of
workers. Note that if human capital plays a⁄ects the transaction and informational
costs between countries, a decline in human capital may also increase the premium
￿t and lead to further decreases in local wages and GDP per capita. We assume
that At = ￿
tA(ht); where ￿ > 1 is a parameter capturing possible common trends in
technological progress,14 and either A
0 > 0 or ￿t = ￿(ht); ￿
0
< 0 (or both) so that the
ratio of wage rates is positively related to domestic human capital (i.e., the average
skill level of domestic workers) and negatively to the stock of human capital in the




where Xt is a set of characteristics a⁄ecting risks and technology in developed (lead-
ing) and developing countries. We can reasonably suppose W(0;h￿





hh 7 0; this means that our model is compatible with local increasing returns
(Romer, 1986) and threshold externalities ￿ a la Azariadis and Drazen (1990).
3.2 The skill-setting equation
Let us now endogenize human capital formation. Young individuals at time t max-
imize a utility function which depends on their levels of consumption when young,
adult, and retired. When young, individuals can work for a wage wt and decide
whether to invest in education. Education at time t, xt; is a take-it-or-leave-it deci-
sion (xt is equal to 0 or 1) and entails a monetary cost cwt where c is an individual
￿xed e⁄ect capturing the ability to learn. For simplicity, we assume that c is uniformly
distributed on [0;1]. When adult, individuals receive a wage wt+1 (if uneducated) or
(1+￿)wt+1 (if educated) which is used for consumption and savings. Finally, savings
14A more sophisticated growth process will be introduced in Section 4.
16st+1 determine consumption during the retirement period. The utility function is
logarithmic and can be written as:







where b ￿t denotes a minimal level of subsistence when young (for simplicity, we assume
there is no such minimum threshold in the other periods), and ￿ is a parameter
re￿ ecting both the relative length of the retirement period and time preferences.
Savings are a continuous variable. Maximizing U (xt;st+1) with respect to st+1
implies that individuals save a fraction ￿ of their second-period income. Hence, the
quasi-indirect utility function can be written as:







where F ￿ ￿ln(￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)ln(1 ￿ ￿) is a constant.
People chose education if V (1) > V (0). The condition for an individual to invest
in education is given by
c <






With a uniform distribution for c, this critical value b ct is equal to the proportion of
young individuals opting for education when young. Without migration, this would
also give the proportion of educated adults in the next period: ￿t+1 = b ct. This
proportion increases with the local wage rate wt and with the skill premium ￿.
For analytical convenience we express the minimum level of consumption when
young as a fraction of the wage rate in the more advanced countries: b ￿t = ￿w￿
t.15











In an economy without migration where each adult has m children, the average
level of human capital of the labor force at time t is given by:







which is clearly an increasing function of b ct.
Substituting Equation (9) into Equation (10) allows us to characterize the level
of human capital as a function of the lagged di⁄erential in skill prices:
ht+1 = 1 +
￿
2







15This assumption implies that liquidity constraints are more severe in countries where the wage
rates are low compared to those observed at destination, which seems reasonable.
17such that H(!t) = 0 if !t < ￿ and, for !t ￿ ￿, H
0 > 0 and H
00 < 0.
Along the balanced growth path, each extensive variable grows at a constant
rate and each intensive variable reaches a steady state value (subscripted ss). Hence,
hss = H(!ss). We refer to Equation (11) as to the skill-setting equation.
3.3 Equilibrium
We focus here on balanced growth equilibria, i.e. on the (!ss;hss) pairs satisfying the
wage-setting and skill-setting equations. As can be seen by combining (6) and (11),
the model is compatible with the existence of multiple equilibria (e.g., a poverty trap
with low levels of human capital and large distance to the frontier, and a high-income
equilibrium with high levels of human capital and low distance to the frontier). A
reasonable con￿guration is provided in Figure 4, where we assume that the relation-
ship between human capital and relative technological development (represented by
the wage-setting equation W(:)) exhibits increasing returns for intermediate values
of human capital (when innovation is being progressively substituted for adoption).











In the diagrammatic example of Figure 4, there are three intersections between
these long-run relationships. Provided that A and B are dynamically stable, equi-
librium A may be seen as approximating the situation of a developing country and
equilibrium B as approximating the situation of a developed country. Such a frame-
work allows changes in domestic policies (e.g., education subsidies that would shift
18the H(:) curve to the right or growth policies that would shift the W(:) curve up-
wards) to be analyzed. In what follows we will focus on how high-skill emigration
a⁄ects long-run outcomes through its e⁄ects on these two curves.
In the following section we use our general set-up to analyze the main channels
through which a brain drain a⁄ects the sending economies and review the existing
evidence on these channels.
4 Brain drain: channels and evidence
4.1 A pessimistic view
As explained in the introduction, the 1970s literature and early work dealing with
brain drain issues using an endogenous growth framework both emphasized the neg-
ative e⁄ects for source countries. This pessimistic view was based on two major
assumptions: either the before-migration stock of human capital was treated as ex-
ogenous to international migration (as in Wong and Yip (1999), who consider only
domestic incentives), or, when it reacts to the prospect of migration, the additional
human capital ends up abroad (as in Haque and Kim (1995)). Under such circum-
stances, and notwithstanding possible feedback mechanisms, a brain drain can only
be detrimental to the source economy.
To illustrate this argument, assume an exogenous fraction p of the highly skilled
population leaves the country. For simplicity, we will assume that low-skill workers
do not migrate. The proportion of highly skilled people among the remaining adults
is then:
￿t+1 =
(1 ￿ p)b ct










(1￿pb ct)2 > 0.
If emigration does not modify the incentives to invest in education (i.e., the critical
level of ability b ct in (9) is unchanged), then the impact of the brain drain on the
proportion of highly skilled people among the remaining adults is clearly negative.
This can be represented in Figure 4 by a shift of the H(:) curve to the left: for a given
technological level, the economy-wide average level of human capital decreases. In
turn, this reduces the capacity to adopt new technologies in relatively poor countries
and the capacity to innovate in relatively advanced countries. Stable equilibria A and
B shift to the left: the economy ends up having less human capital and being more
distant from the frontier.
These e⁄ects could be supplemented by additional mechanisms. First, if the brain
drain from the country of origin is large enough to positively a⁄ect productivity in
the leading economy, this will further increase the technological gap. However, the
concentration of human capital in the most advanced economies can stimulate tech-
nological progress across the world and trickle down to the less advanced economies
19(see Grubel and Scott (1966) and, more recently, Kuhn and McAusland (2009, 2011)
and Mountford and Rapoport (2011)).
Second, in settings where wages are determined non-competitively, highly-skilled
emigration can, paradoxically, increase skilled unemployment. For example, Bhagwati
and Hamada (1974) developed a model in which internationally integrated labor
markets lead the educated elite of developing countries to bargain for higher wages,
with low-skill workers responding by adjusting their wage requirements. On the whole,
more integration leads to more unemployment for all types of workers.16
Third, a brain drain can induce occupational shortages in certain sectors and pro-
fessions (e.g., teachers, engineers, physicians, nurses). If the tasks performed by these
professionals strongly a⁄ect the productivity of other workers, or the accumulation
of human capital in the economy, as could be argued for example from an O-ring
perspective (Kremer, 1993), then such shortages may have a disproportionately high
negative e⁄ect on those left behind
These are the main channels through which a brain drain could reduce human cap-
ital formation and penalize those left behind. The recent literature is less pessimistic:
it puts forward potentially positive feedback e⁄ects and emphasizes that migration
prospects can, under certain circumstances, favor human capital formation.
4.2 Brain drain and human capital formation
To investigate the impact of the brain drain on human capital formation we must ac-
count for the fact that a country￿ s pre-migration human capital stock is endogenous
to the prospect and realization of migration. The recent theoretical literature has de-
veloped probabilistic migration models with either heterogeneous (Mountford, 1997,
Stark et al., 1997, Beine et al., 2001) or homogenous (Stark et al., 1998, Vidal, 1998)
agents where migration prospects raise the expected return to human capital, thus
inducing more people to invest (or people to invest more) in education at home.17
4.2.1 Theory
As in the previous section, assume that high-skill workers have a probability p of em-
igrating whereas the emigration probability of low-skill workers is normalized to zero.
How does this a⁄ect education decisions and the skill-setting equation? The quasi-
indirect utility function must now be changed to incorporate migration prospects for
16Fan and Stark (2007) recently revisited the result that more brain drain can be associated with
more educated unemployment using a job search model.
17A closely-related, yet di⁄erently motivated theoretical argument is that migration enhances
the option value of education in a context of volatile domestic returns to human capital (Katz
and Rapoport, 2005). Since high income volatility is a feature of developing countries, the argument
primarily applies to them. However it can be extended to rich countries by introducing heterogeneous
human capital (general or speci￿c, see Poutvaara (2008)), or asymmetric sectoral shocks.
20the educated only. Assuming for simplicity that skill premiums are constant across
countries, the expected utility of an educated worker becomes:














while the quasi-indirect utility for a low-skill worker V (0) remains as in (8).
The ex-post proportion of educated people is still determined by Equation (12).
However, migration prospects now a⁄ect the pre-migration proportion of high-skill
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If p = 0, !
p
t+1 = 1 and we get the closed economy level in Equation (9). When p
is positive, !
p
t+1 < 1 and the proportion of native people who are educated is higher
than in the closed economy and increases with p.
A bene￿cial brain drain (BBD, or net brain gain) is possible when the numerator
of Equation (14) is positive. Obviously, when p is close to one, this can never be the
case. A necessary condition for a bene￿cial brain gain is that the above derivative



















The main prediction of this model is therefore that:
Summary 1 There are two conditions for a bene￿cial brain drain (BBD) to be ob-
tained in the long-run. First, according to Equation (16), the di⁄erential in skill
prices (!ss) should be low enough to generate strong incentive e⁄ects, but not so low
that liquidity constraints on education investment become strongly binding (in which
case the incentive e⁄ect cannot operate). Second, according to Equation (14), the
probability of highly skilled emigration (p) should be su¢ ciently low.
If these two conditions hold, then the e⁄ect on the H(:) curve is ambiguous: it
might shift to the left for extremely poor countries (due to binding liquidity con-
straints) as well as for rich countries (due to low additional incentives), and shift to
the right for middle-income countries.
These theoretical e⁄ects can be strengthened or weakened by introducing occu-
pational choices, network e⁄ects (Kanbur and Rapoport, 2005), fertility, education
21subsidies (Stark and Wang, 2002), or "brain waste" into the model. For example,
Mountford and Rapoport (2007, 2011) endogenize fertility,18 human capital forma-
tion and technological progress in both the sending and receiving economies in order
to analyze the potential for brain drain migration to a⁄ect the world distribution of
income. Three con￿gurations of "catching up", "divergence", and "core-periphery"
(where brain drain migration contributes to increasing the growth rate and reduc-
ing the fertility rate in all countries while simultaneously increasing world inequality)
emerge from their model. Their simulations show that brain drain migration probably
reinforces the changes in the world distribution of income described by Sala-I-Martin
(2006), with an initial decrease in global inequality (due to rises in GDP per capita
in large, converging developing countries with low emigration rates such as India and
China) before contributing to its future rise (as poor, diverging countries with high
brain-drain rates grow large demographically).
Political economy extensions include that by Docquier and Rapoport (2003), who
show that while the prospect of migration can protect ethnic and religious minori-
ties from excessive discrimination when international mobility is free, restrictions on
mobility can paradoxically increase both emigration and domestic discrimination be-
yond their closed economy level. Mariani (2007), on the other hand, augmented the
allocation-of-talent model developed by Murply, Shleifer and Vishny (1991) to show
that migration can decrease (resp. increase) the fraction of highly skilled workers who
opt for rent-seeking (resp. productive) activities, so o⁄ering another channel through
which highly skilled emigration can enhance growth.
Finally, the ￿eld of study chosen also responds to migration prospects and to shifts
in international demands for speci￿c professions. When foreign and domestic needs
di⁄er, the cost of such distortions in the supply of skills can be quite large (this was one
of the main negative e⁄ects of the brain drain put forward by Michael Todaro (1996)
in early editions of his classic economic development textbook). To give an extreme
example, people contemplating emigration may choose to study geriatrics instead of
pediatrics, meaning that if they end up not migrating, their skills are likely to be
partly wasted. A similar argument was made recently by Di Maria and Stryszowski
(2009) in relation to productivity growth: they assume that adoption and innovation
require di⁄erent types of human capital and, as in our model, that a poor country￿ s
productivity growth relies mainly if not exclusively on its capacity to adopt new
technology. Since migration prospects tend to drive human capital investments away
from ￿elds useful for adoption, poor countries will not bene￿t from their additional
human capital even if would-be migrants end up remaining in the home country. This
is one form of migration-induced ￿brain waste￿ . Brain waste also occurs when people
invest in skills they end up not using even if they succeed in migrating (Mattoo, Neagu
and Ozden, 2008) (for example, when a medical doctor from the Philippines works as
a nurse in London or a geologist from the Dominican Republic works as a taxi driver
in New York). Such brain waste may be due to a host of possible circumstances such
18See also Chen (2006, 2009).
22as lack of information about job market opportunities, discounting of skills due to
imperfect transferability of human capital, or purposeful acquisition of a signal aimed
at increasing one￿ s chance of emigration. However, empirical evidence suggests brain
waste is second order and will therefore be neglected in what follows.19
4.2.2 Macro evidence
As explained, the central argument of the theoretical literature rests on the idea
that expectations about future migration opportunities a⁄ect education decisions.
This raises the question of the formation of expectations. Theoretically, there is a
full set of possibilities ranging from myopic to rational expectations. Empirically, the
"macro" literature has implicitly adopted a myopic view of expectations, where the
empirical counterpart of the "migration prospect" variable is simply the emigration
rate (or the di⁄erential emigration propensity between high and low-skill workers)
observed in previous periods. The ￿rst paper to adopt such an approach is Beine,
Docquier and Rapoport (2001), who used gross migration rates as a proxy for the
brain drain in a cross-section of 37 developing countries. They found a positive and
signi￿cant impact of emigration on gross (pre-migration) human capital formation at
origin, stronger for countries with low initial levels of GDP per capita.
More recently, Beine, Docquier and Rapoport (2008) con￿rmed this result using
Docquier and Marfouk￿ s (2006) estimates of emigration rates for the highest (tertiary)
education level as their measure of brain drain in a cross-section of 127 developing
countries. They obtain an elasticity of 0.054 in the short run and of 0.226 in the
long-run, in both their OLS and IV regressions. Taken literally, this means that
doubling high-skill emigration prospects multiplies the proportion of highly skilled
natives by 1.054 after 10 years and by 1.226 in the long-run. This is not negligible
for countries where the average proportion of highly educated people typically lies
between 2 to 8 percent. Similar results were obtained using alternative brain drain
estimates (controlling for whether migrants acquired their skills in the home or the
host country), alternative de￿nitions of human capital (e.g., school enrolment, youth
literacy), and alternative functional forms (Beine, Docquier and Rapoport, 2010).
While these results appear robust across speci￿cations, they are obtained in cross-
sectional regressions where identi￿cation is always disputable. Here we will brie￿ y
discuss the two main possible sources of endogeneity bias: reverse causality and omit-
ted variables. First, it could well be that increases in the quantity of human capital
are accompanied by increases in its quality, making human capital more internation-
ally transferable and creating spurious positive correlation between human capital
19For example, using the 2008 American Community Survey sample, Gibson and McKenzie (2011)
calculated that "79 percent of working migrants from developing countries with a bachelors degree
or more are working in occupations in which the majority of workers have post-secondary education,
as are 90 percent of those with a masters degree or more, and 96 percent of those with a Ph.D. The
stereotype of foreign workers with Ph.D.s driving taxis is certainly the exception ￿only 2 out of
1,936 developing country migrants with Ph.D.s in the ACS sample are taxi drivers".
23formation and highly skilled emigration. At the same time, an increase in the number
of highly skilled individuals at home can generate an excess supply of skills in the
short-run and translate into more emigration. However, the risk of reverse causal-
ity is likely to be small given the fact that the dependent variable (human capital
investments in the 1990s) barely a⁄ected the stock of highly skilled expatriates in
1990. Nevertheless, the reverse causality issue was addressed by Beine et al. (2008)
using two sets of instrument variables (population size and networks ￿measured by
emigration stocks in 1990 ￿with and without racial tensions). Docquier, Faye and
Pestieau (2008) use additional instrumental variables such as geographical proxim-
ity to developed countries (minimum distance to an OECD country) and indicators
of disadvantageous location (dummies for landlocked countries and small islands)
in their ￿rst stage regressions, with similar qualitative results. Obviously, passing
statistical tests is a necessary but not a su¢ cient condition for instruments validity
and there are certainly theoretical reasons why some of the instrumental variables
selected might a⁄ect human capital formation through channels other than migra-
tion prospects. Easterly and Nyarko (2009) use other sets of instruments (former
colonial links, population size and distance to the main destinations) for a sample of
developing countries; using a growth accounting framework, they ￿nd that the brain
drain causes (gross) skill creation, and no evidence it causes (net) skill depletion.20
Omitted variables and unobserved heterogeneity issues, on the other hand, cannot
be addressed properly in a purely cross-sectional setting. They were tackled by Beine,
Docquier and Oden-Defoort (2011), who used the Defoort￿ s (2008) dataset to estimate
the relationship between migration prospects and human capital formation in a panel
setting (six observations per country, one for every ￿ve years from 1975 to 2000),
controlling for country ￿xed e⁄ects and for the endogeneity of the emigration rate
through the use of GMM dynamic estimation techniques. Their results are very
similar to those described above, with a signi￿cant human capital incentive e⁄ect
which is stronger for low-income countries. The identi￿cation of these incentive e⁄ects
can certainly be improved: notably, it will be interesting to see whether the existing
macro evidence, which points to positive e⁄ects of high-skill emigration on gross (or
pre-migration) human capital formation in developing countries is con￿rmed once
new rounds of censuses become available.
From the perspective of source countries, however, what matters is not so much
the number of people who invest in higher education but the number of educated
remaining in the country after emigration is netted out. To address this issue, Beine
et al. (2008) used their point estimates to perform counterfactual simulations and
compute the net e⁄ect of the brain drain for each country and region. The counter-
factual experiment consists of equating the high-skill emigration rate to the low-skill
emigration rate. As an illustration we will use the following simple numerical exercise:
assume a given generation of 100 members, 20 of whom opt of education and half of
these then leave the country (i.e., the high-skill emigration rate is 50 percent) while
20They also discuss feedback e⁄ects in the spirit of section 4.5 below, with a focus on Africa.
24out of 80 low-skill workers only 10 leave the country (i.e., the low-skill emigration
rate is 12.5 percent). Hence, the emigration rate is 4 times higher for the highly
skilled. Assuming this was also the case in the previous generation, then the ex-post,
ex-ante and counterfactual human capital stocks are given by H2000
p = 10=80 = 0:125;
H2000
a = 0:2; and H2000
cf = 0:2 ￿ 0:05 ￿ ln(4) = 0:13: This hypothetical country has
a counterfactual stock which is higher than its observed stock; it loses half a per-
centage point (or four percent) of its human capital as a result of the brain drain.
On the whole, the simulations results reveal that the countries experiencing a posi-
tive net e⁄ect (the ￿ winners￿ ) generally combine low levels of human capital (below
5%) and low high-skill emigration rates (below 20%), whereas the ￿ losers￿are typi-
cally characterized by high high-skill migration rates and/or high enrollment rates in
higher education. There appear to be more losers than winners, and the losers tend
to lose relatively more than the winners gain. The main "globalizers" (e.g., China,
India, Indonesia, Brazil) all experience modest gains while many small and medium-
size sub-Saharan Africa and Central American countries experience signi￿cant losses.
However, the absolute gains of the winners exceed the absolute losses of the losers,
resulting in an overall gain for the developing world as a whole.
4.2.3 Micro evidence
Evidence of a brain gain e⁄ect has also been found at a micro-level. For example,
Batista, Lacuesta and Vicente (2011) estimated that in Cape Verde, the brain drain
not only has a net positive e⁄ect, it is also responsible for the bulk of human capital
formation in the country. Similarly, in their survey on Tonga and Papua New Guinea￿ s
￿best and brightest￿ , Gibson and McKenzie (2011) show that nearly all the very top
high-school students (85%) contemplated emigration while still in high school, which
led them to take additional classes (e.g., during school vacations, supplementary
English classes) and make changes to their course choices (favoring disciplines such
as science and commerce). According to Gibson and McKenzie, these substantial
brain gain e⁄ects combined with high return rates explain the largely positive e⁄ects
of migration in terms of net human capital formation.
Another micro-example from the Paci￿c region is provided by Chand and Clemens
(2008) who compare the educational investment of ethnic Fijians with that of Fijians
of Indian ancestry in the aftermath of the 1987 military coup (which resulted in
physical violence and discriminative policies against the Indian minority). The coup
sparked massive emigration among highly skilled Indo-Fijians, and led them to in-
vest heavily in higher education in order to ￿clear the bar￿raised by the Australian
(and New Zealand) point system. While the political situation has stabilized since
the mid-1990s, the Indian minority which remains in Fiji is now signi￿cantly more
migratory and more educated than comparable ethnic Fijians, which was not the case
prior to the military coup. The authors interpret this as quasi-experimental evidence
on the brain gain channel. An alternative interpretation could be based on the ￿op-
25tion value￿argument put forward by Katz and Rapoport (2005) and outlined in the
theoretical section above. This argument can be applied to di⁄erences in exposure to
risk across ethnic or other social groupings within a given country. For example, it
can reasonably be argued that ethnic and religious minorities are subject to higher
domestic income volatility, be it because they tend to have a less diversi￿ed invest-
ment portfolio (with more human capital and less physical capital due to the risk of
expropriation) or because they may serve as scapegoats in bad economic times, which
increases downside risks and, hence, overall income volatility.
4.3 Remittances
For some time now scholars have conjectured that remittances from highly-skilled
emigrants can serve to replenish the stock of human capital potentially depleted by
the brain drain (e.g., Grubel and Scott, 1966). For this to be the case, we must
￿rst understand the remitting behavior of the highly-skilled, and second we must
ask whether their remittances are used for education investment. Answering these
questions is also important in the current context of increasingly quality-selective
immigration policies, which have raised concerns in developing countries as to whether
the increasingly high-skill nature of international migration could both hamper the
rise in remittances and weaken the share of remittances invested in education.
4.3.1 Theory
The ￿rst question has to do with the e⁄ect of education on remittances: do the highly-
educated remit more? There are many reasons for expecting a positive answer: better
educated migrants have a higher income potential, are less likely to be illegal and more
likely to have bank accounts and access to less costly transfer means. In addition, their
education may have been funded by implicit loans from family members to be repaid
with interest in the form of remittances. On the other hand there are also many
reasons for expecting a negative answer as more educated migrants often come from
richer families and have a higher propensity to migrate with their entire household
(hence, less need to send remittances) and a lower propensity to return, reducing the
incentives to remit as a way of maintaining prestige and ties to the home community.
A priori then, it is not clear whether the highly skilled will remit more or less on
average. Regarding the use of remittances, recent literature has emphasized the
potential for remittances to relax credit constraints on physical and human capital
investments.21 However, this has been shown for remittances in general, with no
speci￿c attention paid to the remittances from highly-skilled individuals.
To translate these discussions into our analytical framework, let us assume that
21See Yang (2008) for a convincing identi￿cation of the e⁄ect of remittances on households￿invest-
ments, and Rapoport and Docquier (2006) for a comprehensive survey of the literature on migrants￿
remittances. See also McKenzie and Rapoport (2007) on the dynamics of migration and inequality.
26young individuals receive a given amount of remittances, Rt, that for convenience we
express as a share r of the foreign wage: Rt = rw￿
t. Starting from Equation (7), their
income in the ￿rst period of life becomes: wt + rw￿
t ￿ b ￿t ￿ xtcwt.
The critical level of ability below which education is optimal is clearly increasing
















Going back to Figure 4, remittances shift the H(:) curve to the right. However, it is
not clear whether remittances sent by high-skill migrants reach the credit-constrained
segment of the population. In sum,
Summary 2 Remittances sent by high-skill migrants may help to overcome liquidity
constraints, stimulate education investments and reduce poverty at origin. The size
of the e⁄ect depends on the amounts transferred and on their distributional impact.
4.3.2 Evidence
At a macro level, the only empirical studies to look at this issue across a range of
countries are two recent papers (Faini, 2007, and Niimi, Ozden, and Schi⁄, 2010),
both of which use cross-country macroeconomic approaches to claim that the highly
skilled remit less. Faini (2007) shows that remittances decrease with the proportion
of highly skilled individuals among emigrants and concludes ￿ this result suggests
that the negative impact of the brain drain cannot be counterbalanced by higher
remittances￿ . Faini￿ s result is con￿rmed by Niimi et al. (2010) after instrumenting
the number of emigrants (but treating the proportion of highly skilled as exogenous).
Such analyses can at best tell us whether countries which send more (or a larger
share of) highly skilled emigrants receive more or less in remittances than countries
that send relatively less skilled emigrants. However, there are many other ways
that countries di⁄er, and so any correlation between remittances and the skill level
observed across countries may be driven by other factors. For example, if poverty is a
constraint to both migration and education, we may ￿nd richer developing countries
being able to send more migrants (yielding more remittances), and that these migrants
also have more schooling. Moreover, these studies su⁄er from the fact that they use
migration data for emigrants to the OECD area only while the remittance data are for
remittances sent from all over the world, not just the OECD. This creates important
potential sources of bias.
At a micro level, Bollard et al. (2011) combine fourteen household survey data
on immigrants in eleven destination countries. They show a mixed relationship be-
tween education and the likelihood of remitting, but a strong positive relationship
between education and the amount remitted conditional on remitting.22 Combining
22There is also a lot of anecdotal evidence that highly skilled emigrants do remit large amounts.
27these intensive and extensive margins suggests that education has an overall posi-
tive e⁄ect on remittances, with an expected amount remitted of $1,000 annually for
a migrant with a university degree against $750 for someone without a university
degree. The micro-data also allow the reasons why the more educated remit more
to be investigated. Bollard et al. (2011) ￿nd the higher income earned by migrants,
rather than the characteristics of their family situations, explains much of the higher
remittances. Note that these results hold for most of the surveys used, and for the
pooled sample. In contrast, Dustmann and Mestres (2010) use successive waves of the
German Socio-Economic Panel database (one of the fourteen surveys used by Bollard
et al., 2011) and show a negative e⁄ect of education on remittances after controlling
for intentions to return and for household composition at destination.
We can now partially answer the two questions posed at the beginning of this
section. As we have seen, the micro and macro studies available give contradictory
answers to the ￿rst question (as to whether the highly skilled remit more). We con-
jecture that this could be due to the above mentioned issues in the macro studies but
could also be due to sample composition issues in Bollard et al. (2011). Indeed, they
￿nd higher expected remittances among the highly skilled in most surveys but lower
remittances in a minority of them while the pooled micro data are not necessarily
representative of the size and skill structure of global migration. Let us consider for
a moment that Bollard et al.￿ s (2011) results are more trustworthy and give a good
approximation of the macro picture. Simple arithmetic suggests that the highly ed-
ucated, who represent one third of total emigration to the OECD and send home
on average 25 percent more than migrants with primary and secondary education,
send about 40 percent of total remittances. This is clearly substantial. However, in
the absence of surveys matching sending and receiving households and looking at
the relationship of interest ￿not to mention the di¢ culties in identifying the e⁄ect
of remittances on children￿ s education ￿ , we have no way of knowing the extent to
which these remittances reach credit constrained households.
4.4 Temporary migration and return
4.4.1 Theory
Stark et al. (1997) were ￿rst to demonstrate the possibility of a brain gain associated
with a brain drain in a context of migration, imperfect information and return. In such
a context, low-ability workers invest in education for the purpose of emigrating and
being pooled with high-ability workers on the foreign job market. Once individual
productivity is revealed, low-ability workers return home with the human capital
they would not have acquired if it was not for the possibility of emigration, hence
the possibility of a brain gain with a brain drain. Returning migrants may also have
To give just one example, Kangasniemi et al. (2007) report that nearly half of Indian medical
doctors working in the UK remit income to their home country and, conditional on remitting, remit
on average 16% of their income.
28accumulated additional knowledge and ￿nancial capital while abroad, so generating
additional bene￿ts, especially with respect to technology adoption and productivity
growth at home. This idea was formalized by Domingues Dos Santos and Postel-
Vinay (2003) in a setting where growth is exogenous at destination and endogenous
at origin thanks to the knowledge embodied in migrants returning from the more
advanced economy. Dustmann, Fadlon and Weiss (2011) and Mayr and Peri (2009)
employ similar theoretical frameworks.
The e⁄ect of return migration on productivity can easily be accounted for in our
setting by assuming that returnees are endowed with a productivity gain ￿ > 0 per
unit of time spent abroad, which we can denote by a fraction q of their adulthood.
The average level of human capital is then given by
ht+1 = 1 +
￿
1 + m
(1 ￿ q)b ct(1 + ￿q)
1 ￿ qb ct
For a given ex-ante proportion of educated people (b ct), temporary migration in-
creases human capital when ￿ > 1￿b ct
1￿q (i.e., when ￿ and b ct are large, q is low). Under
this condition, the temporary migration of high-skill workers shifts the H(:) curve to
the right on Figure 4.23 The same result obtains indirectly if return migrants facili-
tate knowledge di⁄usion and technology spillovers between countries, except that in
this case it would be the W(:) curve which would shift upwards in Figure 4. In both
cases, return migration is a potential source of growth for the home country.
In terms of the e⁄ects on human capital formation, the are qualitatively simi-
lar to those obtained with uncertain migration prospects. Indeed, for an educated
individual, the expected utility function becomes




t+1 + (1 ￿ q)wt+1
￿
(18)







whereas the quasi-indirect utility function for a low-skill worker remains the same as
that in an economy without migration.
















which is equivalent to Equation (9) when q = 0, and increasing in q as soon as
!t+1 < 1. This additional e⁄ect plays an important role in Dustmann et al. (2011)
and Peri and Mayr￿ s (2009) analyses, as well as in Domingues Dos Santos and Postel
Vinay￿ s (2004) extension of their 2003 paper. A bene￿cial brain drain can be obtained
if the fraction of time spent abroad (q) is not too large and if the di⁄erential in skill
prices is neither too large nor too small. In sum,
23Note that if ￿ is an increasing function of q, this condition depends on q in an ambiguous way.
29Summary 3 Temporary high-skill emigration is bene￿cial to the source country if
enough additional skills are accumulated abroad, if returnees contribute directly or
indirectly to the di⁄usion of new technologies, and/or if the perspective of temporary
migration stimulates education investments ex-ante. A positive net e⁄ect is likely to
be obtained if the fraction of time spent abroad q is not too large and if the productivity
di⁄erential with destination countries is neither too large nor too small.
Note that in the above developments, the migration duration, q, is exogenous, as
if return migration were involuntary. More complex models would allow the migra-
tion duration to be endogenized, for example under a "savings target" constraint, as
proposed in the literature on return migration and access to entrepreneurship back
home (e.g., Dustmann and Kirchkamp, 2002, Mesnard, 2004). The same rationale
can be applied to highly skilled migrants whose migration is aimed at accumulating
managerial skills and gaining access to foreign networks (e.g., Wahba and Zenou,
2009; see also the Indian case study in Section 5.3 below).
4.4.2 Evidence
Are such channels empirically relevant? Return migration is probably the most under-
studied aspect of international migration. Empirical studies of return migration have
focused on assessing the propensity to return at di⁄erent skill levels. While Borjas and
Bratsberg (1996) showed that in general return migration is characterized by negative
self-selection, more recent studies have shown mixed patterns. On the whole, return
rates among skilled professionals tend to increase with home country skill prices and
growth prospects. This is known to be the case for foreign students in the US (Kwok
and Leland, 1982, Rosenzweig, 2008) and for UK immigrants (Dustmann and Weiss,
2007). Mayr and Peri (2009), on the other hand, argue that for migrants from Eastern
Europe, the human capital acquired while in Western Europe yields a higher premium
in the home country (the "return premium"), giving rise to positive selection in return
migration. The models in Mayr and Peri (2009) and Dustmann et al. (2011) also
clarify the conditions under which a brain gain can be obtained when return migration
and schooling decisions are endogenous. Mayr and Peri￿ s model was calibrated and
simulated using real data and estimates from the literature; they conclude that an
increase in the probability of skilled emigration from 0 to 20 percent, replicating the
rise in Eastern European skilled migration during the 1990s, raises average schooling
there by one full year after adjusting for the quality of the repatriated human capital.
Destination-based surveys conducted among skilled expatriates generally ￿nd high
return intentions among interviewees (see for example, Kangasniemi et al. (2007), on
Indian medical doctors in the UK, and Bollard et al. (2011), who ￿nd that return
intentions are similar across skill groups in a wide range of micro surveys).24 In their
survey designed speci￿cally for tracking top students from Tonga, Papua New Guinea
24However, there is often a huge gap between intentions and actual returns.
30and New Zealand, Gibson and McKenzie (2011) ￿nd relatively high rates of return
despite the substantial monetary losses entailed and suggest that return decisions
are a⁄ected by country characteristics and individual considerations beyond income
maximization. Many studies have also emphasized the role of return migrants in
launching new projects and even whole industries at home. For example, a survey
conducted in Taiwan showed that a large fraction of companies in the Hsinchu Science
Park (Taipei) had been started by returnees from the USA (Luo and Wang, 2002).
The Indian case study in the next section also documents the role of returnees in the
rise of the IT sector in India.
4.5 The role of migration and diaspora networks
An important literature emphasizes the potential for migrants to reduce international
transaction costs and facilitate the ￿ ow of goods, factors, and knowledge between
host and home countries. Such migration and diaspora network e⁄ects have long
been recognized by sociologists and in the early work for the brain drain literature.
However, empirical evidence on these channels is quite recent.
4.5.1 Theory
Let us ￿rst re￿ne our description of the mechanism through which human capital
a⁄ects long-run economic growth and the productivity gap between countries. Pro-
ductivity growth is usually seen as depending on the country￿ s capacity to innovate
(￿t) and adopt modern technologies (gt). Following Benhabib and Spiegel (2005) and
Vandenbussche et al. (2006), the dynamics of productivity can be written as:




t denotes the level of productivity in the leading developed economy at time
t, ￿t measures the productivity gain resulting from innovations, and gt measures the
speed of adoption of leading technologies.
In the leading economy, we simply have A￿
t+1 = A￿
t(1 + ￿￿
t). It follows that the
evolution of the distance to the frontier (at ￿ At=A￿














ss ￿ ￿ss + gss
which is clearly increasing in gss and ￿ss, and decreasing in ￿￿
ss.
Innovation capacity ￿t is a non-decreasing function of human capital (ht) with
possible increasing marginal returns. Similarly, adoption capacity is an increasing and
31concave function of human capital. It is likely that the various stages of the education
system play di⁄erent roles in these processes: adoption of foreign technologies requires
individuals with strong technical and professional skills developed through secondary
or specialized higher education, whereas innovation is research-based and requires the
presence of high-level scientists and engineers. Other variables are also likely to have
an impact on productivity growth. Innovation depends on country characteristics
such as public investments in R&D and in higher education, quality of governance,
etc. Adoption depends on subsidies to private R&D and on the intensity of contacts
and exchanges with leading countries.
The sociological literature (e.g., Gaillard and Gaillard, 1997, Meyer, 2001) has long
recognized that the migration of scientists can facilitate the international di⁄usion
of knowledge and technology be it directly, through brain circulation, or indirectly
through the creation and development of networks. For developing countries, this
network externality is likely to a⁄ect mainly technological adoption. It is a priori
unclear whether such externalities depend on the proportion or the number of high-








2 > 0. Nh;t is the number of high-skill natives (i.e. b ctNt),
pNh;t is the number of high-skill emigrants, and ￿ 2 [0;1] is a parameter. If ￿ = 1,
what matters is the size of the high-skill diaspora abroad; if ￿ < 1, what matter is
the proportion of high-skill natives living abroad.
Assuming ￿ss = 0 and ￿￿
ss is given (i.e., the brain drain from a particular country
is too small to a⁄ect innovation at destination), the long-run impact of the brain





















The ￿rst term between brackets can be positive or negative depending whether the
incentive mechanism is smaller or larger than the emigration e⁄ect (see Equation
(14)). The second term is positive and measures technological diaspora externalities.
There are additional network/diaspora e⁄ects which are likely to complement the
productivity growth e⁄ect of technological di⁄usion. Many recent studies have inves-
tigated whether migration favors or discourages trade and FDI. In a standard trade-
theoretic framework, the relationship between migration and trade as well as between
migration and FDI is a relationship of substitutability. Indeed, trade contributes to
factor-price equalization and therefore lowers the incentives for factor mobility; at the
same time, factor movements (beyond the Rybszinski cone) reduce price di⁄erentials
and di⁄erences in factor returns and, hence, the scope for trade and further factor
￿ ows. However, migrants also reduce international transactions costs; this facilitates
the movement of goods and capital between host and home countries. These network
32externalities have been shown to a⁄ect the pattern of trade and FDI and seem to
be mainly driven by highly skilled emigration, at least in the case of FDI. They can
be captured in our framework through their distinct e⁄ects on the two components
of the country￿ risk premium ￿ we introduced in Section 3: international transaction
costs, which are borne by foreign potential investors and trade partners only, and
an institutional risk related to the level of corruption and the quality of governance,
borne by all agents (and also potentially a⁄ected by the existence of political diaspora
networks, as we shall see).





















These analytical developments are compatible with the wage-setting equation (6)
and provide a rationale for including diasporas in the set Xt of characteristics a⁄ecting
the origin country￿ s risk and technology levels. In sum,
Summary 4 By reducing international transaction costs and facilitating the di⁄u-
sion of knowledge and ideas, highly-skilled diasporas settled in the developed countries
encourage technology di⁄usion, stimulate trade and FDI and contribute to improving
domestic institutions. It is a priori unclear whether such diaspora externalities depend
on the proportion or absolute number of highly-skilled emigrants.
4.5.2 Evidence
The key issue in this literature is the identi￿cation of the causal e⁄ect of networks.
As explained by Manski (1993), the presence of omitted covariates might explain the
positive correlation between diaspora size and the dependent variables. Following
Munshi (2003), most studies have used instrumental variables estimation techniques
to identify network e⁄ects.
Business networks: trade and FDI. There are many studies con￿rming the
trade creation e⁄ect of migration (e.g., Gould, 1994, Head and Ries, 1998; Rauch and
Trindade, 2002, Rauch and Casella, 2003, Combes, Lafourcade and Mayer, 2005).
While these studies provide evidence that networks are important in overcoming
informal trade barriers (notably, they ￿nd that immigrant networks have stronger
e⁄ects on trade in di⁄erentiated products), they do not consider speci￿cally highly
skilled migrants. An exception is Felbermayr and Jung (2009), who use bilateral
panel data on trade volumes and migration by education levels and ￿nd a signi￿cant
pro-trade e⁄ect of migration: a one-percent increase in the bilateral stock of migrants
raises bilateral trade by 0.11 percent. However they do not ￿nd signi￿cant di⁄erences
across education groups.
33In the same vein, we may ask whether FDI and migration are substitutes or com-
plements.25 The ￿rst studies to explore the links between migration and FDI have
focused on sectoral or regional case studies. For example, Aroca and Maloney (2005)
found a negative correlation between FDI ￿ ows and low-skill migration between the
border states of Mexico and the United States (i.e., substitutability) while in the spirit
of Rauch￿ s work on trade, Tong (2005) ￿nds that ethnic Chinese networks promote
FDI between South-East Asian countries and beyond, especially where the institu-
tional quality is relatively high. The ￿rst paper to introduce the "skill" dimension of
migration in a bilateral setting is Kugler and Rapoport (2007). Using bilateral FDI
and migration data, they investigate the relationship between migration and FDI for
U.S./rest of the world ￿ ows during the 1990s. The dependent variable is the growth
rate of the capital stock of a country (for 55 host countries) that is ￿nanced by FDI
from the US between 1990 and 2000. This is regressed on the stock of migrants in
the US originating from country i in 1990, on the log-di⁄erence of the change of that
stock between 1990 and 2000, and a number of standard control variables. Regional
￿xed e⁄ects and their interaction with migration are also introduced to deal with
potential unobserved heterogeneity. Their results show that manufacturing FDI to-
wards a given country is negatively correlated with current low-skill migration, as
trade models would predict, while FDI in both the service and manufacturing sec-
tors is positively correlated with the initial U.S. high-skill immigration stock of that
country. Javorcik et al. (2011) con￿rm these results after instrumenting for migration
using passport costs and migration networks with a 30-year lag.
Finally, at a micro level, Foley and Kerr (2008) quantify ￿rm-level linkages be-
tween high-skill migration to the US and US FDI in the sending countries. They
combine US ￿rm-level data on FDI and on patenting by ethnicity of the investors
and ￿nd robust evidence that ￿rms with higher proportions of their patenting activ-
ity performed by inventors from a certain ethnicity subsequently increase their FDI to
the origin country of the inventors. They use ethnicity-year ￿xed e⁄ects to control for
unobserved heterogeneity, and also instrument the ethnic workforce share in each ￿rm
using city-level data on invention growth by ethnicity. They ￿nd that a one percent
increase in the extent to which a ￿rm￿ s pool of inventors is comprised of a certain
ethnicity is associated with a 0.1 percent increase in the share of a¢ liate activity
conducted in the country of origin of that ethnicity. This provides ￿rm-level evidence
of a complementary relationship between high-skill immigration and multinational
￿rms￿activity.
Scienti￿c networks and technology di⁄usion. The identi￿cation of scienti￿c
networks e⁄ects is extremely recent. Agrawal et al. (2011) developed a model in
which innovation depends on access to knowledge and this in turn depends on access
25Interestingly, Buch, Kleinert and Toubal (2006) show that immigration can also attract FDI
from the migrants￿home country to their host country. Using regional di⁄erences in the origin-
mix of immigrants to Germany, they show that the presence of immigrants from a given country
signi￿cantly a⁄ects the regional pattern of FDI to Germany.
34to both "co-location" and "diaspora" networks.26 While on average the co-location
e⁄ect is found to be much larger than the diaspora e⁄ect, the diaspora e⁄ect is
strongest for the most cited patents, which are presumably the ones with the highest
social and economic value. Kerr (2008) also uses patent citation data to examine
the international transfer of knowledge between the US and the home countries of
US-based diasporas. He ￿nds strong evidence of knowledge di⁄usion along the ethnic
diaspora channel, especially for the Chinese diaspora, and evidence that such transfers
have a direct positive e⁄ect on manufacturing productivity in the home countries,
especially in the high-tech sector. Kerr (2008) minimizes the risk of reverse causality
by introducing a large set of country-industry and industry-year ￿xed e⁄ects. He also
uses an alternative/indirect speci￿cation in which ethnic US patents are replaced
by exogenous changes in US immigration quotas by country of origin (following the
Immigration Act of 1990). The ￿ndings of this exercise are qualitatively in line with
the results obtained from the direct ethnic patenting approach.
Political networks and e⁄ects on institutions. It is also only recently that
diaspora externalities in terms of institutional quality and governance and the role of
foreign-educated elites on democracy, have been explored. On the one hand, migra-
tion and associated remittances o⁄er a safety net and as such can relax economic and
political pressures to reform. On the other hand, once abroad, migrants can engage
in economic and political activities that a⁄ect the institutional development of their
home country. In addition, the existence of migration networks abroad increases the
home country population￿ s exposure to foreign political norms and values.
The empirical assessment of these e⁄ects is still at an early stage and, like the
productivity growth channel above, the literature of this topic is limited to just a few
working papers. Li and McHale (2009) used the World Bank governance indicators
(Kau⁄man, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2005) and the Docquier and Marfouk (2006) mi-
gration data set in their cross-sectional analysis. Focusing on high-skill migration,
they conclude that the brain drain has a positive e⁄ect on ￿political￿institutions but
a negative e⁄ect on ￿economic￿institutions at home. However, the way they dealt
with endogeneity (bad institutions leading to more emigration) by using geographic
variables to instrument for migration, is problematic as geography a⁄ects institutions
in a number of ways, not just through migration (e.g., Rodrik, Subramanian and
Trebbi, 2004; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2005a).
Spilimbergo (2009) and Docquier et al. (2011) consider instead dynamic-panel re-
gressions to investigate the e⁄ects of foreign students and of migration/diaspora net-
works, respectively, on home-country institutions (as measured by standard democ-
racy indices). Following the literature on institutions and human capital (e.g., Ace-
moglu et al., 2005b), both papers estimate an equation of the type:
Di;t = ￿0Di;t￿1 + ￿1hi;t￿1 + ￿2mi;t￿1 + ￿3Xi;t￿1 + ￿i + ￿t + "i;t;
26To undertake this research, the authors have developed an original data set allowing Indian
inventors to be identi￿ed by their last names.
35where D is a measure of democracy, m is the emigation rate/share of foreign students
(interacted with a weighted average of democracy scores at destination in Spilim-
bergo￿ s paper), h is a measure of human capital, X is a set of time-varying controls,
and ￿i and ￿t are country and time ￿xed e⁄ects. All the lagged variables are prede-
termined and the estimation uses a rich set of internal instruments (e.g., all variables
in levels are instrumented with suitable lags of their own ￿rst di⁄erences) and com-
bines the regression in di⁄erences with the regression in levels in a single system (SYS
GMM) (see Bond, Hoe› er and Temple, 2001).
Spilimbergo (2009) ￿nds that foreign-trained individuals promote democracy in
their home countries only if the foreign education was acquired in a democratic coun-
try. While he does not identify the exact mechanisms through which such an in￿ u-
ence takes e⁄ect, he suggests a number of possible channels (e.g., the fact that foreign
educated leaders and technocrats may want to preserve the quality of their alumni
networks by serving reasonably democratic regimes and share a sense of common iden-
tity with the international democratic community). More generally, the presence of
foreign-educated individuals make it more di¢ cult for dictatorial regimes to maintain
repression: repressive activities become more costly since foreign-trained individuals
have easier access to external media and foreign governments.
All this can easily be generalized to any individual experience of high-skill emi-
gration and return and adds to the more general channels mentioned above for the
e⁄ects of migration in general. Indeed, Docquier et al. (2011) ￿nd that the level
of emigration and the level of human capital both have a strong positive e⁄ect on
institutional quality in a large sample of developing countries. The marginal e⁄ect
of brain drain migration is therefore uncertain as high-skill emigration simultane-
ously increases total emigration and decreases the stock of human capital left in the
country. Their numerical simulations of this question show a generally positive but
non-signi￿cant e⁄ect of skilled emigration on democracy at home. However, once in-
centives e⁄ects of emigration on human capital investments are taken into account,
a signi￿cant institutional gain obtains for a limited number of countries in the short
run and for a majority of countries in the longer run.
On the whole, the recent theoretical and empirical brain drain literature shows
that high-skill emigration needs not deplete a country￿ s stock of human capital and
can generate positive network/diaspora externalities. First and foremost, it shows
that the brain drain side of globalization creates winners and losers, as the case
studies in Section 5 illustrate, and suggests that the circumstances under which a
country gains or loses from the process can, to a large extent, be a⁄ected by public
policy, as discussed in Section 6.
5 Case studies
The previous section showed that the brain drain is a diverse phenomenon, which
can constrain the development potential of some countries and enhance the economic
36performances of others. This section brie￿ y presents three case studies that illustrate
the various facets of the brain drain and analyzes them within our theoretical frame-
work.27 While the rest of this paper uses a broad de￿nition of high-skill migration,
turning to case studies is an opportunity to put the focus on speci￿c professions and
occupations. African medical doctors, European scientists and researchers, and Indian
IT specialists di⁄er in many respects but they also have many things in common, no-
tably their very high emigration rates, and the fact that they are or have been viewed
as emblematic of the worst types of brain drain. African doctors in London, Lisbon
or Paris still experience a good deal of opprobrium from public opinion. To a large
extent, the same holds true for the exodus of Europeans researchers and scientists.
Expatriated Indian engineers and IT professionals were long been accused of being
traitors to the national cause before the contribution of the resulting diaspora to the
Indian growth miracle became acknowledged and, indeed, celebrated.
5.1 Africa￿ s medical brain drain
It is common to point to the medical brain drain (MBD) as one of the major factors
leading to the under-provision of healthcare sta⁄ in Africa and, ultimately, to low
health status and shorter life expectancy (e.g., Bundred and Levitt, 2000). Two data
sets can be used to document the emigration of African physicians: Clemens and
Pettersson (2006), who collected data on foreign-born physicians and nurses from
nine destination countries in 2000 (UK, US, France, Australia, Canada, Portugal,
Belgium, Spain and South Africa); and Bhargava and Docquier (2006), who used the
same methodology but collected data from 18 countries (17 OECD countries plus
South Africa), de￿ned migrants according to their country of training, and had a
larger geographic (not just Africa) and temporal (yearly observations for 1991-2004)
coverage. Regional comparisons reveal that the medical brain drain is highest in sub-
Saharan Africa (with average rates above 20% compared to 13% in South-Asia and
less than 10% in the other regions). The ￿gures are relatively stable over the period.
Determinants of the medical brain drain. Surveys of African doctors and
empirical analyses of the determinants of the MBD in Africa deliver similar results
on the push and pull factors involved. For example, among the physicians surveyed
by Awases et al. (2003) in six African countries, 50 percent declared that they were
contemplating emigration to gain access to better wages, working conditions and
lifestyles, while the risks associated with caring for HIV/AIDS patients were often
mentioned as an important push factor. Bhargava and Docquier (2008) analyzed the
determinants of the African MBD empirically (using their data set described above)
and found that countries with lower pay for doctors, higher enrollment in secondary
education, and higher HIV prevalence have higher MBD rates.
Is there a medical brain gain? In the spirit of section 4.2 above, we may
ask whether the prospect of emigration generates enough incentives to induce a net
27The factual aspects are taken from Docquier and Rapoport (2009a).
37medical brain gain. Three studies have investigated this issue empirically: Clemens
(2007), who used a cross section of 53 African countries, Chojnicki and Oden-Defoort
(2011), and Bhargava, Docquier and Moullan (2011), who both used a panel setting.
Regressing the log of domestic doctors per capita on the log of medical doctor em-
igrants per capita, Clemens (2007) found a positive correlation of .7. However, the
e⁄ect of emigration becomes insigni￿cant once controls such as GDP per capita, school
enrolment and ethnic con￿ icts are introduced and the number of emigrant physicians
is instrumented using country size and linguistic links. This suggests that emigration
does not create a shortage of medical doctors in Africa, a ￿nding Clemens attributes
to the positive e⁄ect of emigration on enrolment in medical schools.28 Bhargava et
al. (2011) use random-e⁄ect models to investigate possible brain gains in the medical
sector, following Beine et al.￿ s (2008) empirical speci￿cation. Although their model
also suggests that migration prospects have a positive e⁄ect on medical training,
the magnitude appears too small to generate a net brain gain in the medical sector.
This implies that stopping the medical brain drain would increase sta¢ ng levels in
developing countries. The e⁄ect is convex in the rate of the medical brain drain.
Impact on health. Given the lack of strong evidence of brain gain (or loss) in the
African medical sector, another route is to enquire whether the MBD is responsible
for the bad health outcomes of Africa. A positive answer would be consistent with
the view that the MBD is not just about the quantity of doctors remaining in the
continent, but also about their quality. Using the methodology described above,
Clemens (2007) found no evidence for a causal impact of the number of physicians and
nurses abroad on child mortality, infant mortality under the age of one, vaccination
rates, or the prevalence of acute respiratory infections in children under the age of ￿ve.
Chauvet, Gubert and MesplØ-Somps (2008) investigated the determinants of child
mortality in a sample of 98 developing countries between 1987 and 2004 and also found
the number of physicians per 1,000 people to have no signi￿cant impact. However, the
MBD was found to signi￿cantly deteriorate child health indicators, suggesting that
emigrants positively self-select out of the physicians￿population, with only the most
talented obtaining a quali￿cation abroad and leaving. Bhargava and Docquier (2008)
found that the MBD appears to have additional detrimental e⁄ects: a doubling of
the MBD rate is associated with a 20 percent increase in adult deaths from AIDS.
Finally, Bhargava et al. (2011) used numerical simulations to investigate the e⁄ect of
medical emigration on infant mortality and vaccination rates in developing countries.
Although the medical brain drain reduces the supply of doctors in the home country,
they show that stopping it would only produce a marginal improvement in health
outcomes unless the supply of complementary inputs (e.g., medical infrastructures,
28This could also be due to omitted variables such as the size and quality of the medical training
system. Our computations reveal strong correlations between country size and both the number
of medical schools (.82) and the annual number of domestically-trained medical graduates (.6). In
addition, the number of schools and graduates is signi￿cantly higher in English-speaking countries.
Hence, country size and linguistic links might have a direct impact on the domestic supply of doctors.
38availability of drugs, number of nurses) were also increased.
5.2 Europe and the global competition for talent
Where does Europe stand? In the race for innovation and economic leadership,
Europe clearly lags behind the US: it produces more science graduates per capita
(PhDs), but has fewer researchers (5.36 per 1,000 workers against 8.66), a gap which,
as we shall see, is largely dues to the exodus of European researchers. Using bilateral
data in Docquier, Lowell and Marfouk (2009), we ￿nd that by 2000 the EU15 su⁄ered
a net loss of 0.120 million tertiary educated workers to the rest of the world. This
constitutes a tiny 0.3 percent of the European highly skilled labor force. However it
should be compared to the huge combined gains (12.5 percent of the highly skilled
labor force) of the US, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. The de￿cit vis-￿-vis
these countries is enormous: 2.6 million individuals in 2000, a gap which is almost
certainly due to the impact of wage premiums, di⁄erential income taxes, and the
other push and pull factors reviewed in Section 2.2.
Quantitatively, the net de￿cit of the EU15 is low because the losses to the other
developed countries are compensated for by the substantial migration of highly skilled
workers from developing countries. Qualitatively, the picture is darker for two rea-
sons: ￿rst, immigrants are usually less productive than natives with similar formal
levels of education, with the di⁄erence being greatest for workers from low-income
countries (Coulombe and Tremblay, 2009); and second, the European brain drain
a⁄ects top-skill workers. Table 5 shows brain drain rates from Europe to the US for
PhD holders and for researchers employed in science and technology. To make the
￿gures comparable with the DLM brain drain indicators, they are expressed as a
proportion of the total number of researchers/PhD holders employed in the country
of origin and in the US. The brain drain of PhD holders and researchers employed
in science and technology (S&T) is strongly correlated with the general brain drain
(.33 and .74 respectively) but is on average 2.2 and 5.3 times larger. In other words,
European high-skill emigration to the US is strongly biased towards the most highly
quali￿ed workers. An aggravating factor is that the return rates to all large European
countries except the UK decreased during the 1990s (Tritah, 2008).
EU￿ s brain drain and R&D policy. In the same way that we asked whether
the medical brain drain was responsible for Africa￿ s bad health outcomes, we may
ask whether the exodus of European scientists is to blame for Europe￿ s poor record
in research and development. A hint that the causality could well go the other way
is given by Tritah (2008), who showed that European emigrants increasingly come
from the occupations that matter the most for the knowledge economy (engineers,
researchers and academic personnel) and that ￿countries that have increased their
R&D spending more in proportion to their GDP are also those whose expatriation
of scientists and engineers to the United States has increased the least￿ . Based on
an estimated supply and demand framework, Tritah found the brain drain to be a
39symptom of the lack of demand for high-skill labor in Europe. This corroborates the
results from opinion surveys of European researchers, who consistently complain that
low investments in R&D translate into low wages for scientists, unstable or unattrac-
tive jobs, and an excessive load of administrative tasks. On the whole, the picture in
Europe is that of a lack of incentives to enroll in graduate studies in science and tech-
nology; and yet Europe consistently trains more PhDs in these ￿elds that the United
States. While this persistent gap between the supply and demand of researchers in
Europe can be explained by a host of potential factors, it is consistent with the theory
that the brain drain both provides additional incentives to invest in education and
absorbs the excess domestic supply of European scientists and researchers.
Table 5. The brain drain of European scientists from selected countries
to the US (%)
Country of birth College graduatesa PhD holdersb Researchers in S&Tc
Austria 3.7 4.2 12.6
Belgium 1.0 2.3 12.9
Denmark 2.3 4.8 9.3
Finland 1.3 1.4 1.9
France 1.0 2.8 7.6
Germany 2.4 2.7 18.0
Greece 4.2 8.5 28.4
Ireland 10.6 16.0 33.0
Italy 3.2 2.6 17.0
Netherlands 2.3 3.1 15.6
Spain 1.1 1.9 n.a.
Sweden 1.8 1.6 6.7
United Kingdom 4.8 6.2 29.0
Czech Republic 2.7 3.9 12.5
Hungary 4.7 12.5 24.9
Latvia 4.7 8.7 45.3
Lithuania 3.2 5.6 24.3
Poland 5.7 5.7 n.a.
Romania 4.1 4.8 34.4
Japan 0.9 1.8 4.9
China 2.1 22.8 14.9
Sources: a Emigration rates of college graduates; source: DLM (2009). b Emigration rates
of PhD holders; based on SESTAT (NSF) and UNESCO data. c Emigration rates of
researchers in S&T; based on SESTAT and OECD main S&T indicators
405.3 The Indian diaspora and the rise of India￿ s IT sector29
The Indian-born population in the US doubled (from one half to one million) in the
1990s, with half of the increase being due to the arrival of highly skilled workers.
Table 2 shows that there were more than a million highly skilled Indian emigrants
worldwide in 2000, placing India second only to the Philippines among developing
countries (and almost on a par with the Philippines after excluding people arrived
before age 22 ￿see Table 3). As is well known, Indians also represent the bulk of
H1-B visas holders in the US, a visa category aimed at skilled professionals in sectors
with occupational shortages (in practice, IT specialists).
The presence of highly educated Indians among the business, scienti￿c and aca-
demic elites of the UK, the US, and other Western countries is impressive and has
long been both a matter of national pride and of persistent concern. Echoing this
ambivalence, Desai et al. (2009) evaluated the ￿scal cost of the brain drain for India
at 0.5 percent of the Indian GDP (or 2.5 percent of total Indian ￿scal revenues), a
conservative estimate in their view. However, their computations are based on the
assumption that all Indian engineers abroad would have worked as engineers in India,
and would have engaged in engineering studies in the ￿rst place, which is disputable.
If one assumes that in alternative occupations their wages would have been lower,
then their ￿gures for the ￿scal loss can equally reasonably be seen as an upper bound.
On the other hand, the fact that many Indian engineering graduates end up in man-
agerial jobs (for example, 52 percent of the graduates of IIT-Bombay of 2005-6 ended
up in consulting and ￿nance), which pay much better than engineering. Perhaps more
importantly, if the loss is not that of engineers per se but a selection bias in which
entrepreneurial talent is lost, then the tax losses are on corporate and VAT/sales
taxes rather than income taxes. In any event, recent years have seen a gradual rever-
sal in media and public attitudes in India,30 and it is now common to celebrate the
contribution of the Indian diaspora to the country￿ s industrial and economic success.
We will focus here on the role of the Indian diaspora, especially that established
in the Silicon Valley, in the rise of the IT sector in India. Studies pointing to the role
of the Indian diaspora in the rise of the software industry in India include Saxenian￿ s
(1999, 2002) well-known work. She noted the large numbers of Indian (and Chinese)
entrepreneurs in the Silicon Valley: Indians were shown to run 9 percent of Silicon
Valley start-ups in the period 1995-98, a majority of which (nearly 70 percent) were
in the software sector.31 Saxenian (2002) also documented their strong business links
29We are indebted to Devesh Kapur, Binod Khadria, and Ramana Nanda for references, comments
and discussions on this case-study.
30Khadria￿ s (1999) book on India￿ s "migration of knowledge workers" also contributed to this
change by emphasizing that human capital can return without people physically returning and by
discussing the policy environment conducive to such circulation.
31A more recent survey (Wadhwa et al., 2007) shows Indian immigrants now outnumber Chinese
immigrants as founders of engineering and technology companies in the Silicon Valley, with Indians
being key founders of 15.5 percent of all Silicon Valley startups.
41with India: 52 percent of the Indian entrepreneurs travelled to India for business
purposes at least once a year, 27 percent reported regularly exchanging information
on jobs/business opportunities and on technology with people back home, 46 percent
had been a contact for domestic Indian businesses, 23 percent had invested their own
money into Indian start-ups, and 45 percent reported that is was likely that they
would return to live in India. These results are based on a non-representative sample
(due to self-selection into the professional associations surveyed and to the group of
respondents) but are nevertheless suggestive of very strong connections to India.
The role of the Indian diaspora has been singled out as a primary factor of India￿ s
emergence onto the global IT scene, notably by Kapur (2010), whose account can be
linked to our general arguments. First, India￿ s brain drain provided foreign investors
with information on the Indian labor force, sparking demands for Indian IT specialists
in countries without experience of Indian migrants (e.g., Germany, Japan) as well as
international demand for IT services exported from India.32 Two closely related
factors probably contributed to the visibility of the Indian IT professionals: the
Y2K bug problem, which led many organizations to engage primarily Indian sta⁄ to
solve this issue; and the presence (thanks to the ￿rst wave of brain drain) of Indian
managers working in the IT departments of large US/European companies, who then
got in touch with people they knew in India (and vouched for their quality). This is in
line with our description of the transaction cost channel, especially with the argument
in Section 4.5.1 that migrant workers convey information through their presence in
the host countries labor markets and are key to establishing business links.
Second, India￿ s brain drain helped di⁄use knowledge through a variety of mech-
anisms: skill upgrading for those working in the US, with di⁄usion to India through
return migration and brain circulation.33 This may have been driven, in part, by the
recession following the dot-com bust (when many skilled professionals were without
jobs and returned home), and the simultaneous take-o⁄ of the Indian economy fol-
lowing the reforms of the early 1990s. These reforms were driven by macro-economic
factors such as a balance of payments crisis. The reduction in import restrictions
after the opening up of the economy also contributed to the growth of the software
and service industries and allowed the entry of multinational corporations who began
paying dollar-equivalent salaries in rupees (which was incredibly attractive on a PPP
basis). This is a perfect illustration of the knowledge and technology di⁄usion chan-
nel, as well as of the brain circulation or return migration with additional repatriated
skills and human capital (Sections 4.4 and 4.5.2).
Third, the diaspora has been a decisive factor in setting up e⁄ective sectoral insti-
tutions and formal networks. The national association of software and service compa-
nies (NASSCOM) had several returnees as prominent advisors of board members and
32See also Banerjee and Du￿ o (2000).
33This is con￿rmed by a recent comprehensive survey of India￿ s software industry, showing that
30 to 40 percent of the higher-level employees have relevant work experience in a developed country
(Commander et al., 2008).
42helped raise the pro￿le of the industry in India and abroad. Another organization
(TiE ￿the Indus entrepreneur) also helped to provide a forum for aspiring entre-
preneurs of Indian origin, ￿rst in the US and then in India. These institutions and
networks also helped to lobby for a better framework for entrepreneurship in India,
and successfully lobbied the Indian government to change the regulatory framework
for venture capital. This exempli￿es the type of institutional reform leading to better
regulations and more e⁄ective economic and political institutions that we empha-
sized and documented in Section 4.5.3 on political networks. While this example is
restricted to a particular sector, it is not di¢ cult to imagine that once such lobby-
ing organizations are in place, with their set-up costs already met, they can also be
activated towards achieving broader political and institutional reforms.
And fourth, instead of developing a protectionist attitude by trying to keep engi-
neers and IT specialists at home, the Indian industry realized the bene￿ts of foreign
experience and supported an increase in the number of H1-B visas for Indian profes-
sionals in the US. The reason for this lies in changes in the market structure of the
global IT industry, itself a lagged e⁄ect of previous emigration. Ten of the largest
twenty-￿ve companies hiring foreign nationals with H-1B visas are IT ￿rms based
in India or US-based IT ￿rms run by Indian nationals. This can clearly be inter-
preted along the lines suggested in our Sections 4.2 (on endogenous human capital
formation) and 4.4. (on return migration).
All this demonstrates the crucial role played by the Indian diaspora at the onset of
the IT revolution which took place in the 1990s and in the later phases. India￿ s IT rev-
olution is already well advanced, and this raises the question of whether the diaspora
will maintain its leading role or simply serve as an adjuvant in the coming phases. The
￿ndings from a recent survey sent to all the CEOs of Indian software ￿rms are prob-
ably indicative of such qualitative changes. Indeed, Nanda and Khanna (2010) found
that while entrepreneurs who live in hubs do not necessarily gain signi￿cantly from
diaspora networks, having personal experience abroad allows entrepreneurs based in
smaller cities, with weaker networking and ￿nancing environments, to gain access
to business and ￿nancial opportunities through diaspora networks. They conclude
that brain circulation is crucial: such networks are successful not just because of the
expatriates who live abroad, but because some of them have returned back home and
learned how to e⁄ectively tap into the diaspora.
6 Policy implications
Should emigration countries rethink their education policy in the face of the brain
drain? Are immigration policies in receiving countries at odds with their aid and
development policies? Is a "tax on brains" required (or feasible) for a better sharing
of the global surplus arising from international high-skill migration? To address these
policy issues within our framework we will assume that the implicit social welfare
function guiding government intervention is to maximize e¢ ciency as measured by
43GDP per capita in source countries.34
6.1 Education policy in sending countries
Given that the social return to education is higher than its private return, education
subsidies can in theory be, and are in practice used to address human capital exter-
nalities. Should they be adjusted in the context of a brain drain? This issue has been
addressed in a few recent studies, ￿rst by Stark and Wang (2002) who explored how
migration and education subsidies may be substituted for as policy tools. Docquier
et al. (2008) re￿ne the argument and provide empirical evidence showing that it is
true that public expenditure on education is lower in high-skill emigration countries,
including after instrumenting for emigration. Poutvaara (2008) proposes a theoreti-
cal model where the brain drain distorts the provision of public education away from
internationally transferable education (e.g., exact sciences, engineering, economics,
medical professions) and towards country-speci￿c skills (e.g., law), with the source
country possibly ending up training too few engineers and too many lawyers; he then
demonstrates that such a negative outcome could be avoided by introducing graduate
taxes or income-contingent loans to be (re)paid if the student subsequently emigrated.
To address this question, we introduce education policy into our model. Suppose
the government subsidizes education by covering a fraction ￿ of the education cost
and levies a proportional income tax on resident highly skilled workers. Compared
to Equation (13), the expected utility for an educated worker becomes:














while the quasi-indirect utility function for a low-skill worker V (0) remains identical
to that in an economy without migration (see Equation (8) with xt = 0).
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If ￿ = ￿ = 0, we obtain the closed economy level in Equation (15). The critical
ability level b ct increases with ￿ and decreases with ￿ (at least if p < 1).
The no-de￿cit condition can be written:





2 is the average ability level of the young educated and 1 + m is the number
of young per adult. For a given rate of brain drain p, the education policy allows
34See however Docquier and Rapoport (2009b) for a discussion of the possible e¢ ciency-equity
tradeo⁄s which would arise from more complex social welfare functions.
44for increasing human capital when the critical ability level in (23) exceeds the no-














The function ￿min(￿) represents the set of improving education policies; it is in-
creasing and convex in ￿. The function ￿max(￿) represents the set of feasible education
policies; it is increasing and linear in ￿. Figure 5 represents these two functions for
two possible values of p: the black curves depict the closed economy case (p = 0)
and the grey curves a case where some brain drain takes place. Clearly, the brain
drain shifts the ￿min(￿) and ￿max(￿) curves downwards: for each possible tax rate,
it reduces ￿min(￿); the minimum subsidy rate required to stimulate human capital
formation. The reason is that educated individuals now anticipate that they will only
pay domestic taxes with probability 1 ￿ p. It also reduces ￿max(￿), the maximum
subsidy rate balancing the budget constraint. In other words, the brain drain expands
the set of improving tax rates and reduces the set of feasible subsidy rates.
These analytical developments suggest that governments should react to the de-
parture of the highly educated by adjusting the public supply of higher education.35
As Figure 5 suggests, the feasible education subsidy rates decrease and the tax rates
required to balance the budget increase with high-skill emigration. Cutting subsidies
(possibly in particular ￿elds) is therefore likely to be the appropriate policy response
in a context of high brain drain. Other possible routes include promoting foreign
education, adjusting education quality, or having a strategy of exporting skilled pro-
fessionals. We brie￿ y discuss these possibilities below.
Home governments can free ride on destination countries￿foreign education pro-
grams, and encourage students to get their education abroad. This certainly repre-
sents a source of ￿scal gain, especially for small countries su⁄ering from very high
emigration rates. On the other hand, outsourcing tertiary education makes access to
education more unequal and, as emphasized by Rosenzweig (2005), foreign education
gives its possessors a better chance of ￿nding a job in the training country. This means
that student mobility is likely to further increase the brain drain. Alternatively, home
governments can increase education expenditures and improve the quality of domestic
higher education institutions to retain more students, for example through quality-
assurance programs (i.e., certi￿cation of the quality of higher education by national
35A possible endogenous policy response in source countries is to adjust the supply of public
infrastructure (Grossman and Stadelmann, 2011).
45or international agencies). Such a strategy is aimed at reducing uncertainty about ed-
ucation quality (while at the same time making it more transportable internationally)
and has been adopted in a number of Asian and Latin American countries.36 Finally,
the government can disengage from higher education and encourage the emergence
of private universities and professional schools. The Philippines are often cited as
an example of such disengagement coupled with a deliberate strategy of exporting
skilled workers.37While it is beyond the scope of our stylized model to show which
route is preferable, this discussion suggests that the answer depends on the extent to
which the quality of domestic education a⁄ects the transferability of human capital.
It also suggests that policy responses need not be uniform as countries with di⁄erent
characteristics will have di⁄erent optimal strategies.


















Notes. The tax rate ￿ is on the horizontal axis and the subsidy rate ￿ on the vertical axis.
The "subs min" curve depicts ￿min as a function of ￿ and de￿nes the set of improving
education policies. The "subs max" curve depicts ￿max as a function of ￿ and de￿nes the
set of feasible education policies. The black curves represent the no-migration case and the
grey curves an economy with p = :25. Simulations are based on ! = :4, ￿ = 2 and
m = :5:
36See Lien (2008) for examples and a theoretical discussion of the e⁄ects of such programs.
37Observing the very high rates of enrolment in higher education in the Philippines in spite of the
low domestic returns to human capital, Lucas (2004) commented: ￿It is di¢ cult to believe that these
high, privately ￿nanced enrolment rates are not induced by the possibility of emigration. There are
signs that the choice of major ￿eld of study ... responds to shifts in international demands. Higher
education is almost certainly induced to a signi￿cant extent by the potential for emigration￿ .
466.2 Immigration (and emigration) policy
The implications of this analysis for migration policy are also far reaching. Provided
that Condition (16) holds, Equations (14) and (15) determine the brain drain rate
maximizing human capital accumulation at origin, p￿. This rate satis￿es:

















































Using the implicit function theorem, it can easily be shown that
@p￿
@! < 0 for
￿ = 0. This result is intuitive: in the absence of liquidity constraints, the incentive
mechanism is stronger in poorer countries and the optimal brain drain rate decreases
with the level of development. When ￿ is positive, the incentive mechanism is less
strong in poor countries. If
￿
!t is such that condition (16) does not hold (i.e., if
￿
!t
exceeds some critical value ￿), p￿ = 0. When Condition (16) holds but
￿
!t is slightly
lower than ￿, we have
@p￿
@! > 0. In sum, p￿ is an inverted-U shaped function of
the wage ratio !. It increases with development at low levels of development but
decreases at higher stages of development (see Figure 6).
In analyzing p￿, we will focus on human capital accumulation but disregard other
feedback e⁄ects such as remittances and diaspora/network externalities. Introducing
these additional feedback e⁄ects would increase the optimal rate of emigration to
p￿￿ > p￿. The di⁄erence between p￿￿ and p￿ is also likely to depend on the coun-
try￿ s distance to the technological frontier (because adoption externalities are more
important at lower stages of development) and on other characteristics such as in-
stitutional quality, especially if diaspora size and geographic proximity matter for
network externalities.
From the perspective of developing countries, the main implication of this result
is that the optimal emigration rate of their highly educated population is likely to be
positive (at least at intermediate levels of development), which implies that imposing
restrictions on the international mobility of educated residents could actually decrease
the long-run level of their human capital. From the perspective of receiving countries,
the main implication is that selective immigration policies aimed at attracting the
highly educated and skilled may or may not contradict the objectives of their aid
and development policies. However, there is little a host country can do to alter the
origin-mix of its immigrants as diaspora networks and invariant bilateral variables
largely explain the size and skill composition of their immigration (see Section 2.2).
47For the sake of illustration, let us brie￿ y analyze the origin-mix of highly skilled
immigrants to Western Europe (EU15). Europe is currently less selective than the
United States and other traditional immigration countries and therefore has greater
potential for more selectivity. Given what we know from cross-country analyzes on
the push and pull factors of migration, a change in European immigration policies
(such as the introduction of point-systems or similar selection devices) will primarily
a⁄ect the traditional suppliers of skills to the European economy. Europe dispro-
portionately attracts migrants from demographically small, economically poor, and
institutionally disadvantaged countries, especially African ones. These countries are
typically those negatively a⁄ected by the brain drain and they are often lacking the
characteristics required to enjoy positive interactions with diaspora networks. Hence,
they would su⁄er from immigration policy becoming both more restrictive (i.e., dis-
couraging low-skill immigration) and more quality-selective (i.e., favoring high-skill
immigration) in Europe. Conversely, the United States have a much less quality-
selective immigration policy than Canada or Australia, and many immigration re-
formers in the U.S. advocate going to a point system (e.g., Borjas, 1999). To the
extent that most US immigrants come from large, fairly globalized economies, an in-
crease in high-skill emigration from these countries would not necessarily harm them;
they would certainly su⁄er, however, if the U.S. immigration policy becomes more
restrictive.









Notes. The p￿ curve gives the high-skill emigration rate maximizing human capital accumulation
in the source country as a function of the development level, !. Idem for p￿￿ once remittances and
diaspora externalities are taken into account.
486.3 Taxation policy: the case for a Bhagwati tax
The idea of a "tax on brains" was ￿rst proposed in the 1970s by Jagdish Bhagwati.
He argued that: i) it should be an income tax paid by highly skilled emigrants on
top of their regular income tax, with its proceeds transferred to the home country
government; ii) the rationale for the tax is double: compensation (for the negative
externality imposed on those left behind and on home governments for their public
funding of education), and equity (through redistributing the rents accruing to skilled
emigrants as a result of restrictions on international labor mobility).
How does a Bhagwati tax ￿t into our model? Consider the economy described in
Section 6.1 and assume the foreign wage of high-skill emigrants is taxed at a rate T.
The expected utility function of educated individuals becomes:




t+1(1 ￿ T)(1 + ￿)
￿
+ (25)







while the quasi-indirect utility function for a low-skill worker V (0) remains identical
to that in an economy without migration (see Equation (8)).
















(1 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)1￿p(1 + T)p
￿
; (26)
The budget constraint of the government becomes




assuming that the proceeds from the tax are fully allocated to education policy.
Introducing a Bhagwati tax requires cooperation between the home and host coun-
try governments. We assume such cooperation takes emigration rates as exogenous
but allows for ￿scal adjustments. It is reasonable to assume that for a given emigra-
tion probability p, the government at destination chooses taxes T to maximize the
number of high-skill emigrants pb ct. The government at home, on the other hand,
chooses taxes ￿ to maximize the number of educated adults remaining,
(1￿p)b ct
1￿pb ct . In
both cases, their objective is to maximize b ct subject to Constraint (27) and to an
incentive compatibility constraint: the net income of emigrants should exceed the net
income of the home country residents: (1 ￿ T) > (1 ￿ ￿)!.
Substituting (27) into (26) and assuming a balanced growth equilibrium (b ct =
b ct￿1), the joint maximization problem of the goverments at origin and destination












(1 + ￿)(1 ￿ ￿)1￿p(1 + T)p
￿)
49An interior solution (￿￿;T ￿) to this optimization problem requires
!ss(1 ￿ T
￿) = (1 ￿ ￿
￿); (28)
which clearly satis￿es the incentive-compatibility constraint. In particular, a positive
Bhagwati tax (from the point of view of the destination country) is obtained when
t > 1 ￿ !ss, that is, when the tax rate in the country of origin is large enough and
when the distance to the frontier is not too large.
In its current version, the Bhagwati tax proposal goes part of the way towards
addressing the various objections raised at di⁄erent stages of its formulation. The
main issues currently discussed are whether the tax should be administered at a
bilateral level or by some international authority (see McHale, 2009), and whether it
should be based on a compensation principle. As noted by Bhagwati (2009), there
may be no need for compensation as education is often privately ￿nanced and/or
acquired abroad. In addition, many highly skilled emigrants would be unemployed or
ine⁄ectively employed at home, while others emigrate to escape corruption, violence,
and economic discriminations ￿conditions which should certainly not be encouraged
by ￿scal compensations.38 It has also been argued the Bhagwati tax is equivalent to
an exit tax and represents a form of extortion. In its latest version, therefore, the tax
is basically one on retained citizenship (i.e., emigrants can avoid paying the tax by
voluntarily forfeiting their citizenship). However, the countries whose emigrants would
be happy to renounce their citizenship are precisely those whose characteristics are
conducive to a detrimental brain drain. This suggests that opting for a compensating
mechanism on a voluntary basis may prove impossible in practice. Finally, the very
principle of compensation can be questioned as many developing countries appear
to actually bene￿t from high-skill emigration. Even though there is now a growing
consensus that the rationale for such a tax should be surplus sharing, a formula
supported by all the sides involved has yet to be found.
7 Conclusion
This paper has reviewed four decades of economics research on the brain drain, with
a focus on recent contributions and on development issues. We started with an
assessment of the magnitude, intensity and determinants of the brain drain, showing
that high-skill migration is becoming the dominant pattern of international migration
and a major aspect of globalization. The fact that international migration from poor
to rich countries is becoming more of the brain drain type is a serious source of concern
in developing countries and the development community. Through the brain drain,
it would seem, globalization is making human capital scarcer where it is already
38See also Wilson (2011), who shows that a tax on brains could bene￿t the home country even
when home country governments are malevolent, and Wilson (2008) for a voluntary mechanism
based on an insurance-upon-return tax cut proposal.
50scarce and more abundant where it is already abundant, thereby contributing to
increasing inequality across countries, including among the richer ones. To examine
the mechanisms and evidence behind this view, we designed a stylized growth model,
￿ exible enough to encompass the various channels through which a brain drain a⁄ects
sending countries, and reviewed the evidence on these channels.
The recent literature shows that high-skill emigration need not deplete a coun-
try￿ s human capital stock and can generate positive network externalities. The brain
drain side of globalization creates winners and losers among developing countries, and
certain source-country characteristics in terms of governance, technological distance,
demographic size, and interactions between these, are associated with the ability of
a country to capitalize on the incentives for human capital formation in a context
of migration and seize the global bene￿ts from having a skilled, educated diaspora.
As illustrated with case studies of the African medical brain drain, the exodus of
European scientists to the United States, and the role of the Indian diaspora in the
development of India￿ s IT sector, the conditions under which a country is gaining or
losing are not a matter of fate; to a large extent, they depend on the public policies
adopted in the receiving and sending countries.
Where do we go from here? As we have seen, an urgent task is to improve the
state of international migration data along several dimensions: time series and fre-
quency, occupations, more disaggregated education levels, age of entry and gender
decompositions, country coverage and bilateral disaggregation, and tracking; in par-
ticular, migration "￿ ows" are currently measured as changes in the stocks over a
given period and it is impossible to know how exactly these changes balance attrition
(and whether attrition is caused by death, return migration or emigration to a third
country) and new entry ￿ ows. The state of comparative data on immigration laws
and policies, especially their bilateral dimension, may be the second most limiting
factor on cross-country analyses of the determinants of migration ￿ ows and for the
analysis of the consequences of these ￿ ows on the receiving and sending economies.
Partly because of data constraints, many of the macro studies surveyed do not
identify the causal e⁄ects of high-skill emigration on development in a fully convinc-
ing way. As a result, the sign and magnitude of these e⁄ects remains a source of
controversy among economists. Similarly, micro studies of migration and develop-
ment have not yet taken full advantage of the randomization revolution; while this
is beginning for migration studies in general (see McKenzie and Yang, 2010), the
only paper we are aware of which exploits a (policy) experiment targeting high-skill
migrants is Clemens￿(2010) study of the income gains from migration for Indian
H1-B visa lottery winners.39 Another urgent task is thus for researchers to design
and exploit the panel and bilateral dimensions of future migration data sets40 for
39Until 2006, visa applications to the US were processed on a "￿rst come ￿rst serve" basis. In
2007 and 2008, the number of applications from India in the ￿rst hour greatly exceeded their quota
and so it was decided to process applications through a lottery.
40Ozden et al. (2011) has both the panel and bilateral dimensions but lacks the skill dimension.
51cross-country analysis and, at a micro level, to investigate existing natural and policy
experiments (e.g., the US Diversity Lottery Visa) to identify the causal e⁄ects of
high-skill migration on development outcomes.
Finally, it is noteworthy that although the links between high-skilled emigration
and economic development are clearly bidirectional, they have only been investigated
in a single direction so far. However, empirical analyses of the determinants of high-
skilled emigration show that poor economic performance and its correlates (such
as rampant poverty, bad institutions, discriminations, political repression, etc.) are
all important determinants of emigration in general and of high-skill emigration in
particular. In these studies (surveyed in Section 2), country characteristics are treated
as exogenous. On the other hand, from section 3 onward, we investigated the causal
impact of brain drain migration on economic development. Combining these two
approaches at the aggregate and bilateral levels is a promising avenue of research. The
bidirectional causal link between emigration and poverty can induce both vicious and
virtuous circles (e.g., an adverse economic shock can induce high-skill workers to leave
the home country while the migration response to the shock determines its eventual
e⁄ect on the economy). Endogenous high-skill emigration can therefore be a source
of multiplier e⁄ects and contribute to propagate shocks across regions; this opens the
possibility of multiple equilibria and coordination failures in emigration decisions. A
third important direction for future research, therefore, is to try to better understand
these interdependencies and derive their implications for the design of development
policies.
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